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I.  Executive summary 
What is the aim of this paper? 
1.  This paper provides a literature review and critical analysis on the following aspects 
of non-economic losses of climate change: the conceptual background including how non-
economic losses contribute to loss and damage and the total cost of climate change; the 
main  types  of  non-economic  losses  that  might  occur  and  the  ways  in  which  they  may 
materialize; various assessment techniques available to estimate non-economic losses, both 
generically  and  through  concrete  examples  of  current  practice;  and  implications  of  the 
different assessment techniques for the identification of non-economic risks and the design 
of  practical  adaptation  actions  to  manage  them.  Consistent  with  the  UNFCCC  work 
programme on loss and damage, the main focus of this technical paper is on developing 
countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 
What are non-economic losses and why are they important? 
2.  Climate  change  will  affect  a  wide  range  of  social,  economic  and  environmental 
systems.  It  has  become  common  to  split  these  impacts  into  non-economic  losses  and 
economic losses. Economic losses can be understood as the loss of resources, goods and 
services that are commonly traded in markets. As such, economic losses should be recorded 
by and manifest in the system of national accounts (although they may not be in countries 
with large informal economies). Market prices can be used to value economic losses.  
3.  Non-economic  losses  can  be  understood  as  the  remainder  of  items  that  are  not 
economic items; that is to say that non-economic items are those that are not commonly 
traded in markets. The absence of a market price is one of the main reasons why assessing 
non-economic losses is challenging. However, their effect on human welfare is no less 
important.  
4.  In many developing countries, non-economic losses may well be more significant 
than economic losses. Recognizing and managing the risk of non-economic loss should 
therefore be a central aspect of climate change policy.  
How do non-economic losses contribute to total climate costs? 
5.  The total costs of climate change consist of the following elements: 
(a)  Mitigation costs: the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to limit the 
extent of climate change; 
(b)  Adaptation costs: the cost of dealing with the consequences of unavoidable 
climate change; 
(c)  Loss  and  damage:  the  residual  costs,  which  cannot  be  avoided  through 
adaptation and mitigation and which can be further split into: 
(i)  Economic loss;  
(ii)  Non-economic loss. 
6.  Non-economic losses are therefore one of four cost elements that constitute the total 
cost of climate change. There is a link between the magnitude of adaptation cost, mitigation 
cost and loss and damage. Increasing the mitigation effort (higher mitigation costs) will 
reduce  loss  and  damage  and  might  make  adaptation  cheaper.  For  example,  greater 4 
 
mitigation should result in a smaller increase in sea levels and so less protection from sea 
level rise will be required. Increasing the amount of adaptation (higher adaptation cost) will 
also  reduce  loss  and  damage.  For  example,  changing  agricultural  practices  to  suit  the 
change in climate will cause less disruption than a failed crop. 
What are the main types of non-economic losses? 
7.  Non-economic losses occur in three distinct areas: private individuals, society and 
the environment. More specifically, non-economic losses can be understood as losses of, 
inter  alia,  life,  health,  displacement  and  human  mobility,  territory,  cultural  heritage, 
indigenous/local knowledge, biodiversity and ecosystem services. 
8.  Non-economic losses may occur through many channels. They may be related to 
both slow onset impacts (e.g. the loss of territory to sea level rise) and extreme events (e.g. 
loss of life in a cyclone) associated with climate change. The loss may be directly linked to 
adverse  climate  change  impacts  (e.g.  loss  of  ecosystems)  or  occur  indirectly  (e.g. 
malnutrition as a consequence of impacts in the agriculture sector). 
9.  The distinction between non-economic loss and economic loss will sometimes be 
blurred. For example, damage to natural ecosystems is primarily a non-economic loss, since 
ecosystem services are rarely traded on the market. However, there may be market impacts 
if one of the services the ecosystem provides is food or fibre, the provision of which is part 
of the market economy.  
Can non-economic losses be valued? 
10.  While  valuation  in  common  parlance  is  associated  with  money  and  therefore 
economic methods, a broader interpretation of the act of valuation is simply to “compare 
the relative merits of actions or objects”. There is a lot of experience worldwide with the 
assessment  and  valuation  of  non-economic  impacts  of  human  development  and  natural 
phenomena in this way. 
11.  This  technical  paper  identifies  four  broad  categories  of  valuation  technique: 
economic valuation, multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA), composite risk indices and 
qualitative/semi-quantitative  methods.  All  of  them  have  been  used  in  a  climate  change 
context. 
12.  The aim of economic valuation is to express non-economic impacts in monetary 
terms, rendering them comparable to economic impacts and costs. The main methods of 
non-market valuation are (a) revealed preference methods, which observe what people do 
(e.g. the money spent on visiting cultural sites) and (b) stated preference methods, which 
elicit  valuations  from  surveys.  Sometimes  it  is  possible  to  derive  values  from  existing 
studies,  obviating  the  need  for  bespoke  new  analysis.  This  method  is  called  benefits 
transfer. 
13.  MCDA, composite risk indices and qualitative /semi-quantitative approaches do not 
seek to put money values on non-economic losses. MCDA and composite risk indices use 
formal scoring and weighting to the same end. Qualitative/semi-quantitative methods do 
not attempt to aggregate to the same extent, so it is up to the users of the analysis to 
compare and evaluate the many effects of policy choices.  
14.  Whatever method is chosen, the assessment and valuation of non-economic impacts 
remains very difficult, due to the many uncertainties involved, as well as the essential role 
of value judgements. These difficulties are usually magnified where analytical capacity is 
limited.   5 
15.  Owing to this complexity, it is very difficult to express aggregate damage in a single 
number of “total non-economic loss”. Economic valuation techniques have been applied to 
the  problem,  and  there  are  indicative  monetary  estimates  from  integrated  assessment 
models,  but  a  detailed  quantification  of  non-economic  loss  is  more  likely  to  rely  on  a 
number of different metrics, such as disability adjusted life-years (DALYs) in the case of 
health impacts. 
How can decision makers take into account non-economic losses? 
16.  The assessment of non-economic losses is not the first time that policymakers have 
confronted the question of how to take into account the non-economic effects of human 
development and natural phenomena. Experience has accumulated over several decades and 
in  many  countries  of  the  assessment  of  the  environmental  and  social  impacts  (usually 
alongside  the  economic  impacts)  of  new  economic  development,  of  existing  economic 
activity and of natural environmental phenomena. 
17.  Many frameworks have been developed for these purposes, including environmental 
impact assessment (EIA), strategic environmental assessment (SEA), environmental risk 
assessment,  cost–benefit  analysis  (CBA),  wealth/capital  accounting,  vulnerability 
assessment, disaster loss/damage assessment and climate change impacts, adaptation and 
vulnerability assessment (CCIAV). 
18.  All  these  frameworks  have  their  advantages  and  disadvantages.  Their  suitability 
depends  on  institutional  contexts  as  well  as  the  problem  at  hand.  What  they  have  in 
common  is  that  they  offer  well-established  toolkits  and  a  rich  body  of  experience  in 
accounting for non-economic factors in economic and social decision-making.  
What are the challenges for policymakers when managing the risk of non-
economic loss? 
19.  Managing potential non-economic losses from climate change combines two sets of 
challenges  that  policymakers  may  already  be  familiar  with.  The  first  challenge  is  the 
identification  and  quantification  of  non-economic  value  and  its  inclusion  in  decision-
making, using the techniques introduced above. Incorporating non-economic values into 
economic  decision-making  would  go  a  long  way  to  ensure  non-economic  systems  are 
robust and healthy. 
20.  However,  using  these  techniques  as  a  matter  of  course  requires  institutional 
adjustments and a change in appraisal mentality. Monitoring, assessing and managing non-
economic  impact  has  to  become  standard  practice,  in  the  way  financial  and  economic 
appraisal already are. 
21.  The second challenge is adaptation to climate change more broadly. Many of the 
issues  faced  by  the  adaptation  community  are  the  same  whether  the  aim  is  to  prevent 
economic loss or non-economic loss. Making good adaptation decisions will reduce the risk 
of economic and non-economic losses alike, as the two are often linked. For example, flood 
protection will help to avoid loss related to production interruptions (an economic loss) as 
well as distress and the outbreak of disease (a non-economic loss). 
22.  The literature on good adaption decisions stresses two immediate issues. The first is 
to set adaptation priorities for the immediate future, with a focus on win–win measures that 
yield immediate benefits (e.g. flood protection, environmental protection) and measures 
that affect the long-term vulnerability profile of countries (e.g. planning and infrastructure 
decisions). 6 
 
23.  The second immediate adaptation issue is to remove barriers to effective adaptation 
by both public and private decisions makers. It is important to recognize the practical limits 
to adaptation. Problems may be institutional, policy-related, market-related, cognitive or 
related to insufficient funding, information and skills. The way non-economic impacts are 
treated  –  measured,  valued  and  assessed  –  in  adaptation  decision-making  is  one  such 
barrier. The general barriers to adaptation may also be stronger for non-economic losses 
than for economic losses as institutions, policymakers and markets tend to be less aware of 
non-economic losses. 
II.  Background 
24.  The UNFCCC work programme on loss and damage was established at COP 16 in 
order to “consider approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change 
impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change” (decision 1/CP.16). The work programme is part of the broader Cancun 
Adaptation Framework, which aims to enhance action on adaptation, reduce vulnerability 
and build resilience in developing countries. 
25.  At COP 18, Parties requested the “preparation of a technical paper on non-economic 
losses” (decision 3/CP.18, para. 10) as part of the work programme on loss and damage. 
This report provides background material to the secretariat for the preparation of that paper. 
The aim of both the background report and the technical paper is to: 
(a)  Analyse the range of non-economic losses associated with climate change 
impacts and how they fit within the concept of total climate change costs; 
(b)  Assess methodologies to value/assess the impacts of climate change that are 
considered non-economic and examine the application of these assessment  methods for 
adaptation planning and practices; 
(c)  Identify challenges, gaps and priorities to advance the understanding of and 
action to address non-economic losses. 
26.  The background report is structured as follows: 
(a)  Chapter III below provides conceptual background on non-economic loss, 
including how non-economic losses contribute to loss and damage and the total cost of 
climate change; 
(b)  Chapter  IV  below  describes  the  main  types  of  non-economic  losses  that 
might occur and explores the ways in which they may materialize; 
(c)  Chapter  V  below  discusses  various  assessment  techniques  available  to 
estimate non-economic losses, both generically and through concrete examples of current 
practice; 
(d)  Chapter VI below discusses what the different assessment techniques imply 
for the identification of non-economic risks and the design of practical adaptation actions. 
27.  Consistent with the work programme on loss and damage, the main focus of the 
paper is on developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change. 
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III.  Non-economic losses in the context of climate change 
An explanation of terms 
1.  Loss and damage 
28.  Loss and damage describes the impact associated with the adverse effects of climate 
change. These adverse effects include those related to extreme events and slow onset events 
such  as  sea  level  rise,  increasing  temperatures,  ocean  acidification,  glacial  retreat  and 
related  impacts,  salinization,  land  and  forest  degradation,  loss  of  biodiversity  and 
desertification.
1 There  is  no  clear  distinction  between  losses  and  damages  in  either  the 
literature or under the Convention (although see UNFCCC, 2012), and the two terms are 
treated as largely synonymous in this technical paper. 
                                                            
 
1  Decision 1/CP16 paragraph 25. 
Box 1 
Summary of non-economic losses 
-  Non-economic losses are one of four cost elements that constitute the total cost of 
climate change. The total costs of climate change consist of mitigation costs (the cost 
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions), adaptation costs (the cost of dealing with the 
consequences of unavoidable climate change) and loss and damage (the residual 
costs, which cannot be avoided through adaptation and mitigation), which can be 
further split into economic loss and non-economic loss.  
 
-  There is a link between the magnitude of mitigation cost, adaptation cost and loss 
and damage. Increasing the mitigation effort (higher mitigation costs) will reduce 
loss and damage and might make adaptation cheaper. Increasing the amount of 
adaptation (higher adaptation cost) will also reduce loss and damage. 
 
-  It has become common to split impacts of climate change into non-economic losses 
and economic losses. Economic losses can be understood as the loss of resources, 
goods and services that are commonly traded in markets. Market prices can be used 
to value economic losses. 
 
-  Non-economic losses can be understood as the remainder of items that are not 
economic items; that is to say that non-economic items are those that are not 
commonly traded in markets. The absence of a market price is one of the main 
reasons why assessing non-economic losses is challenging. 
 
-  In many developing countries, non-economic losses may well be more significant 
than economic losses and in some cases may be irreversible, such as the loss of 
cultural items or territory. Recognizing and managing the risk of non-economic loss 
should therefore be a central aspect of climate change policy. 
 
-  This technical paper is informed by our current understanding of loss and damage. 
This understanding is in turn limited to our knowledge of past events and what 
models tell us about future impacts of climate change. Thus, there may be additional 
non-economic losses which are not considered here due to conceptual, knowledge 
and data gaps. 8 
 
29.  The  impact  of  climate  change  that  is  of  ultimate  concern  is  not  these  physical 
effects, but the impact they have on people. Human systems are vulnerable to the physical 
impacts of the climate; loss and damage is a function of the physical impacts and the degree 
of  vulnerability  to  these  impacts  (Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change,  2012, 
chapter 1, page 32). Therefore, to understand loss and damage it is essential to understand 
the magnitude of physical impacts, the degree to which human systems are vulnerable to 
impacts  and  the  way  in  which  individuals  and  society  value  the  impacts  that  they  are 
vulnerable to. These together determine the magnitude of loss and damage arising from a 
given physical impact. 
30.  Figure 1 shows how climate change may increase the severity of climate-related loss 
and damage, represented by the dashed and dotted line. It also shows how adaptation, while 
reducing loss and damage (going from the dashed and dotted line to the solid line), also 
imposes  costs,  which  means  that  the  net  cost,  the  dashed  line,  is  higher  than  residual 
climate  change  damage  but  lower  than  climate  change  damage  without  adaptation. 
Stabilizing at a given global mean temperature will also entail mitigation costs. 
Figure 1 
Adaptation reduces gross damages, leaving residual damages,  
but adds to the costs of adaptation 
 
Source:  Adapted from Stern (2007).  
31.  An important simplification in figure 1 is that it does not consider uncertainty; that 
is, the wide range of possible climate damages that may occur for a given global mean 
temperature. It is important to understand that, for any given climate, there is a risk of a 
range of levels of loss and damage occurring and that this range is large. Assessments of 
loss and damage must account for this fact if they are to be adequate. 
32.  People are exposed to climate risk even without climate change, that is to say that 
there  is  always  a  probability  distribution  over  the  range  of  possible  levels  of  climate 
damage  that  climate  events  can  cause  due  to  uncertainty  in  forecasting  regardless  of 
whether the climate is changing. This uncertainty, also known as climate variability, means 
that individuals and society do not face just one scenario of loss and damage but instead 
loss and damage should be understood as having a range of possible magnitudes, each with 
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an  associated,  although  often  unknown,  chance  of  occurring.  In  figure  2  the  range  of 
possible climate damages without climate change is represented by the dotted and dashed 
probability distribution. 
33.  Climate change exposes individuals and society to a different, most often higher, 
profile of risk, or probability distribution, of loss and damage. The potential risks of climate 
change are represented by the dotted probability distribution in figure 2 This profile can be 
reduced by mitigation as this reduces the magnitude of climate change relative to ‘business 
as usual’ (dashed curve). The profile of risks can be further reduced by adaptation, which 
reduces vulnerability to climate damages (solid curve). Note that the figure abstracts from 
the possibility that both climate change and climate policy may alter not just the position, 
but also the shape of, the probability distribution. 
34.  The remaining difference in the profile of risks between a situation with ‘no climate 
change’ (dotted and dashed curve) and a situation with ‘climate change, plus mitigation and 
adaptation’ (solid curve), is the risk of loss and damage attributable to climate change. 
Individuals and society face two effects from the change in profile of risks due to climate 
change. First, there may be an increase in the risk of high loss and damage as climate 
change may result in an increase in high damage events, for example through adverse slow 
onset events or an increase in the frequency and/or intensity of extreme events. This is the 
dashed area between the solid curve and the dotted and dashed curve. There may also be a 
decrease in the risk of low loss and damage as climate change may result in fewer low 
damage climate events. This is the diagonally shaded area between the solid curve and the 
dotted and dashed curve. The diamond-hashed area, where the solid curve and the dotted 
and  dashed  curve  overlap,  describes  the  risk  of  climate  damages  that  does  not  change 
between the situations of ‘no climate change’ and ‘climate change, plus mitigation and 
adaptation’. The net change in the risk of loss and damage between situations will vary 
across regions and time. 
Figure 2 
Climate change affects the profile of risk of climate damage, which can in turn be changed 
through mitigation and adaptation, with loss and damage as the residual change in risk 
 
 
Note: The shapes of the probability distributions are for illustration only. The change in distribution due to 
climate change, mitigation and adaptation is not limited to, or necessarily, a shift in the whole distribution. For more 
information on the possible changes in climate-related probability distributions see Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (2012, figure SPM.3).  
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2.  The total cost of climate change 
35.  Loss and damage is not the only cost associated with climate change. Costs are also 
incurred in reducing the potential damages from climate change through mitigation and 
adaptation; that is, in figure 2, in moving from the dotted probability distribution to the 
dashed and then to the solid probability distribution. 
36.  As figure 3 shows, the total costs of climate change are therefore equal to the cost of 
mitigation, plus the cost of adaptation, plus the risk of loss and damage attributable to 
climate  change.  The  different  cost  components  are  unlikely  to  accrue  equally  across 
countries or people. Countries particularly vulnerable to climate change, for example, will 
face a disproportionate share of loss and damage, while Parties included in Annex I to the 
Convention are currently expected to shoulder most of the mitigation burden. 
37.  There  is  a  link  between  the  magnitude  of  adaptation  cost,  mitigation  cost  and 
residual loss and damage. Increasing the mitigation effort (higher mitigation costs) will 
reduce loss and damage and  might  make adaptation cheaper. Increasing the amount  of 
adaptation (higher adaptation cost) will also reduce residual loss and damage. By choosing 
the right combination of mitigation and adaptation it may therefore be possible to reduce 
not  just  loss  and  damage,  but  also  the  total  cost  of  climate  change,  although  cost 
minimization will not be the only objective when determining mitigation and adaptation 
effort. 
Figure 3 
Non-economic losses are a subset of the risk of loss and damage, which is part of  
the total costs of climate change 
 
Note: The shapes of the probability distributions are for illustration only. 
38.  It has become customary to divide loss and damage further into a non-economic (or 
non-market)  component  and  an  economic  (or  market)  component.  Table  1  gives  some 
examples of non-economic and economic loss and damage. However, the distinction is 
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somewhat arbitrary and in practice the share of damage  of each type is  unknown. But 
adopting this distinction, the total cost of climate change can then be further split into the 
following components (shown in figure 3): 
(a)  Mitigation costs; 
(b)  Adaptation costs; 
(c)  Loss and damage: 
(i)  Economic loss; 
(ii)  Non-economic loss. 
39.  The focus of this technical paper is on non-economic losses, which are a subset of 
the  residual  loss  and  damage  attributable  to  climate  change.  Loss  and  damage  due  to 
climate change in turn is a subset of the total costs of climate change. In many developing 
countries, non-economic losses may well be more significant than economic losses, and 
perhaps the most significant aspect of climate change. 
Table 1 
Examples of economic and non-economic loss and damage 
Economic losses  Non-economic losses 
Loss of wages  Loss of life 
Loss of crops  Reduction in biodiversity 
Reduction in tourism revenue  Destruction of items of cultural significance 
Loss of economic revenue from coastal 
activity due to inundation  Loss of sovereignty due to inundation 
 
3.  Non-economic losses 
40.  Non-economic losses are best understood in relation to economic losses. Economic 
losses can be understood as the loss of resources, goods and services that are commonly 
traded in markets. As such, economic losses will be recorded by and manifest in the system 
of  national  accounts  (although  not  for  economic  losses  that  are  borne  in  the  informal 
economy); that is to say that economic losses can affect gross domestic product. Market 
prices can be used to value economic losses.  
41.  Non-economic  losses  can  be  understood  as  the  remainder  of  items  that  are  not 
economic items; that is to say that non-economic items are those that are not commonly 
traded in markets. The absence of a market price is one of the main reasons why assessing 
non-economic loss and damage is challenging, but their effect on human welfare is no less 
important. 
42.  Non-economic  losses  can  also  be  given  a  substantive,  although  incomplete, 
description. Non-economic losses can be understood as losses of or related to, among other 
things,  life,  health,  displacement  and  human  mobility,  territory,  biodiversity,  ecosystem 
services, cultural heritage, indigenous/local knowledge and other social capital. These are 
explained in more detail in chapter IV below. However, it should be recognized that this is 
not a complete list of non-economic losses. 12 
 
43.  Furthermore, items can have both economic and non-economic value, and so their 
destruction  can  lead  to  both  economic  and  non-economic  losses.  For  example,  the 
salinization of agricultural land can cause a loss of crops, which have an economic value, 
and also the loss of indigenous knowledge connected with stewardship of that land, which 
is a non-economic loss. This technical paper, focusing on non-economic losses, does not 
consider  coincident  economic  losses.  However,  when  non-economic  losses  can  lead  to 
economic losses this will be noted in chapter IV below, for example loss of biodiversity 
could lead to lower tourism revenues. 
44.  Non-economic losses, like economic losses, can be direct or indirect. Direct losses 
are those that are immediately attributable to a climate event. For example, loss of health or 
life due to an extreme weather event is a direct non-economic loss. Indirect losses are those 
resulting  from  changes  in  the  system  in  response  to  a  climate  event.  For  example,  a 
decrease in health due to malnutrition that is the result of higher food prices and food 
shortages is an indirect non-economic loss. 
45.  In summary: 
(a)  Losses  can  be  categorized  as  non-economic  or  economic,  where  non-
economic losses tend to be losses of items that are not often traded in markets. These items 
can have both economic and non-economic value and so there can be multiple types of 
losses from a destructive event; 
(b)  Losses can have spillover effects, which result in further losses, sometimes of 
a different type; 
(c)  Losses can be classified by their relation to a destructive event; that is to say 
the loss can be a direct or an indirect result of a destructive event. 
Valuation, measurement and comparability of non-economic losses 
46.  As explained in chapter III.1 above, the impact of climate change that is of ultimate 
concern is the effect of physical impacts on individuals and society, rather than the physical 
impacts themselves. People are at the centre of any consideration of non-economic losses. 
So  the  way  in  which  individuals  and  society  perceive  and  value  impacts  must  be 
understood. This first requires an understanding of what is valued and how, or if, value can 
be measured. If there are multiple sources of value a further issue, of comparability, must 
be explored. This issue is concerned  with the possibility of aggregating and/or  making 
trade-offs between different sources of value. These issues are now briefly explored. 
47.  Humans have many systems of value. These systems define valuable objectives that 
humans  strive  to  achieve.  There  are  three  common  frameworks  for  describing  such 
systems: 
(a)  Welfare: in this utilitarian framework maximizing welfare is the objective. 
Welfare is achieved through the consumption and experience of both tangible and non-
tangible items. An important notion in this framework is that items can often be substituted 
for each other; for example, a loss in biodiversity can be made good by an increase in 
material consumption and as a result all value can be monetized. The concept of welfare is 
most useful when applied to economic sectors, as the value of trade-offs is determined by 
common consensus through prices; 
(b)  Well-being: in this framework, articulated in Sen (1999), well-being comes 
from  a  number  of  sources  and  cannot  be  achieved  unless  objectives  in  each  of  the 
determinants of well-being are achieved. A simple example is that without good health 
material  wealth  is  unlikely  to  be  fulfilling.  There  is  no  definitive  description  of  the   13 
determinants  of  well-being,  but  the  framework  is  broadly  accepted  and  has  influenced 
important  programmes  such  as  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP) 
Human Development Index and the Millennium Development Goals; 
(c)  Ethical frameworks: ethical objectives can be distinct from objectives that 
directly better humanity. For example, preserving other species may not be detrimental to 
welfare  or  well-being  but  it  could  be  an  ethical  imperative.  Rights-based  ethical 
frameworks are also distinct from welfare and well-being frameworks as under a rights-
based framework the betterment of humanity is achieved by observing rights, such as the 
right to life, rather than through any means possible. Welfare and well-being frameworks 
are  also  ethical,  but  they  are  also  anthropocentric  and  have  at  least  some  concept  of 
permissible substitution between items of value. Ethical frameworks are different because 
they need not centre on human needs and place firm boundaries on acceptable actions; for 
example,  rights  to  life  and  freedom  from  hunger  cannot  be  transgressed  or  must  be 
positively supported at the expense of other actions. 
48.  These systems of  value describe  what is valued. Within  these  systems,  items of 
value can also be described in terms of how they are valued. The following distinction is 
often made: 
(a)  Use value: an item can be valuable if it is used in a process that achieves a 
valuable objective. Items can have direct and indirect  use values;  for example,  food is 
directly useful in maintaining health while trees are indirectly useful in maintaining health 
by, for example, reducing air pollution. Option value describes the difference in use value 
that an item may have in the future compared with the present; 
(b)  Non-use value: an item has non-use value if knowledge about it, rather than 
use of it, increases welfare or well-being. Bequest and existence value are important non-
use values. Value arises because preserving an item for future or current generations can 
provide a sense of satisfaction. 
49.  Use and non-use value can be considered as the two parts of the total economic 
value, which is the sum of all the ways in which an item can be valued, as illustrated in 
figure 4. The concept is called total economic value, even though it deals with items that 
have non-economic value, because all items of non-economic value in the framework are 
monetized,  using techniques  described in chapter  V.B below. That is to  say that in an 
assessment of the total economic  value all  non-economic items are  given an economic 
valuation. This concept is used in assessments of the value of ecosystems, such as the 
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), a major global initiative to develop 
and use systems of measurement for ecosystems and biodiversity. 14 
 
Figure 4 
Total economic value describes the sum of ways in which items can be valued, although 
methods of indirect economic valuation must be applied to non-economic items  
if they are to be added together in practice 
 
Note: Examples of each type of value are given in the dashed boxes. 
Source: Adapted from TEEB (2010a). 
50.  A distinction can also be made between intrinsic and instrumental value. An item 
with intrinsic value is valuable simply because it is what it is. For example, a human life or 
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a species can be thought of as having intrinsic value. An item with instrumental value is 
valuable because through that item a valuable objective can be achieved. For example, food 
has instrumental value because it maintains health.  
51.  Intrinsic and instrumental values do not necessarily align with use, non-use, option 
and ethical values. For example, an ecosystem may have non-use value but only because 
satisfaction is gained from knowing that it continues to exist. The ecosystem’s continued 
existence is therefore instrumental in achieving value, but it would not have value in itself 
if no one found it satisfying that it existed. Indeed, in a welfare or well-being system of 
value the only item of intrinsic value is welfare or well-being; everything else is a means to 
achieving welfare or well-being. 
52.  Items of value may be incomparable, which means that the value of one item cannot 
be expressed in terms of the value of another item. For example, the value of a decrease in 
biodiversity may not be expressible in terms of years of good health lost. A consequence of 
incomparability is that loss and damage cannot be aggregated into a single number and 
trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation and residual damage can be difficult to make. 
53.  It is a matter of debate as to whether values are incomparable or not. In a welfare-
based system of values there are few issues of incomparability and all items can in principle 
be expressed in  money terms, although ascertaining  monetary values  for non-economic 
items  can  be  difficult  in  practice  and  not  quantifying  them  may  help  decision  makers 
(Spackman, 2013). However, in a well-being or ethical system of values incomparability 
may be an issue. A simple difficulty in making comparisons of value, as may occur in the 
case of non-economic items in a welfare-based system of values, may make aggregation 
unwise, even if there are no issues of outright incomparability. This is because aggregation 
makes the comparison on behalf of others. The alternative, of leaving difficult to compare 
impacts disaggregated, allows others to make their own comparisons. 
54.  Non-economic items are often given economic valuations as a form of assessment, 
as explained in chapter V.2 above. For example, loss of life can be monetized using a 
concept  known  as  the  value  of  a  statistical  life,  which  measures  people’s  attitude  to  a 
change in mortality risk. When this process occurs it does not mean that the non-economic 
item has become an economic item. Instead, a non-economic item has, through indirect 
methods,  been  given  an  economic  value  as  a  means  of  assessment.  This  should  be 
contrasted with the direct method of economic valuation via market prices that is possible 
for economic items. 
55.  Items can have different values across time, space and possible states of the world. 
Difference in value across time refers to the fact that people often discount the value of an 
item  in  the  future  relative  to  the  same  item  in  the  present.  Both  economic  and  non-
economic  items  can  be  discounted,  as  both  have  value,  although  estimating  the  rate  at 
which  non-economic  items  are  discounted  can  be  challenging.  Gollier  (2012,  p  248) 
provides an in-depth discussion on issues of discounting. Differences in valuation across 
space describe the fact that different people within a time period can value an item in a 
different way. For example, a poor person may value an extra unit of money more than a 
rich person. Difference in valuation across possible states of the world refers to the fact that 
the future is uncertain and in some states of the world an item will be valued differently 
than in another state of the world. For example, a particular colony of animals will be more 
valuable if they are the last of the species than if they are one colony among many. 
56.  Aggregating across time, space and states requires assumptions, such as the discount 
rate, that may be disputed and can hide important context. This implies that aggregation of 
loss and damage, if needed, must be done transparently and with care and the need for 
aggregation in many cases should be questioned. Issues of valuation, measurement and 
comparability can be summarized by the following questions: 16 
 
(a)  What is valued? Humans have many systems of value, of which three major 
types are welfare, well-being and ethical and rights-based frameworks; 
(b)  How is it valued? Items can have use and non-use values, from which finer 
distinctions can be made, such as existence non-use value or direct, consumptive, use value; 
(c)  Where  does  the  value  reside?  Items  can  have  instrumental  value,  as  they 
provide a way to achieve a valuable objective, or intrinsic value if they are valuable in 
themselves; 
(d)  Is the value of different items comparable? It can be a matter of debate as to 
whether the value of one item can be expressed in terms of the value of another item. If 
there are difficulties in comparison it can be best to avoid aggregating values under one 
metric; 
(e)  How does the value of an item vary across time, space and possible states of 
the world? An item in the future can often be perceived to have less value than the same 
item in the present, which is known as discounting; an item may have a different value to 
different people (i.e. the value of an item can vary across space); and an item may have a 
different value across states of uncertainty. 
Non-economic losses in the context of human activity 
57.  Climate change affects the system of human activity and so an impact to a part of 
the system must be understood in the context of the entire system. Non-economic losses 
occur in different parts of the system of human activity and figure 5 provides a model of 
human activity that allows such loss and damage to be understood in the context of the 
entire system. 
58.  In figure 5 stocks of resources, some economic and some non-economic, provide 
flows  of  services  and  are  also  themselves  transformed  into  other  types  of  resource  or 
consumed.  For  example,  the  stock  of  human  capital  provides  a  flow  of  work;  natural 
capital, such as a mineral deposit, may be transformed into a machine, a type of physical 
capital;  or  natural  capital,  such  as  oil,  may  be  consumed.  In  figure  5  initial  stocks  of 
resources are represented on the left, with their flows of services in the dashed and dotted 
arrows. Final stocks of resources are on the right. 
59.  These services and resources are used by individuals and society to achieve valuable 
objectives. The objectives of individuals and society can be very broadly defined and the 
implications of this for non-economic losses are explored in chapter III.0 above. Services 
and resources can be used as inputs to economic activity to provide consumption items, or 
they can be used directly by individuals and society. In figure 5 this is shown in the central 
section of the diagram by the box for economic activity and for individuals and society. 
Non-economic goods and services are primarily used in the latter way, although economic 
sectors also use non-economic goods and services to produce consumption items. 
60.  Climate change affects human activity in a number of ways. Figure 6 highlights this 
by adding diagonally-hashed arrows to figure 5. These arrows illustrate the changes in 
activity that climate change induces. Climate change can require the diversion of resources 
for mitigation and adaptation. It can also inflict loss and damage in the form of reduced 
flows of services from stocks and reduced levels of stocks themselves. The reduction and 
diversion of resources reduces the ability of individuals and society to achieve valuable 
objectives. The degree to which climate change prevents valuable societal objectives being 
achieved is the true measure of the total damage of climate change. Climate change can 
also  reduce  the  stock  of  resources  available  to  achieve  future  objectives,  which  is  one 
reason why the impacts of climate change need to be considered over time.   17 
61.  Ignoring non-economic loss results in a very limited understanding of the pathways 
along  which  total  climate  change  damages  occur.  Figure  7  builds  on  figure  6  by 
highlighting, using a wave-hash background, the main areas of human activity in which 
non-economic losses occur.  
62.  Many  resource  stocks  are  at  least  in  part  non-economic  and  so  they  are  not 
accounted  for  in  standard  economic  statistics.  These  include  natural  capital,  such  as 
biodiversity and ecosystems, social capital and cultural capital. Even standard economic 
inputs such as human capital and land can be affected by non-economic factors, such as 
loss of territory and loss of life and health, respectively. 
63.  When resource stocks are affected by climate change, the flow of both economic and 
non-economic services is reduced, although only the former will be recorded in the national 
accounts. Non-economic service flows (such as spiritual services from ecosystems) tend to 
be ignored. 
64.  Even  if  they  were  recorded,  measures  of  economic  welfare  tend  to  focus  on 
consumption rather than wider measures of individual and societal welfare.  
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Figure 5 
In this model of human activity, stocks of resources provide flows of services and are used themselves, in economic and non-economic ways, to achieve 
objectives that have value to individuals and society; stocks persist and are used to achieve objectives in the future 
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Figure 6 
Total damage from climate change can divert and reduce the flows of services from stocks and the levels of stocks themselves, as well  
as disrupting the economy; this is highlighted using a diagonal-hash background; this reduces the ability of individuals and society to achieve valuable  
objectives and can reduce the stock of resources available to achieve future objectives 
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Figure 7 
Non-economic losses are a subset of the total damage from climate change and tend to affect some resources more than others;  
these are highlighted using a wave-hash background. Non-economic losses also tend to directly affect individuals and society rather than primarily  
reducing economic activity, although this occurs to some extent 
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IV.  A typology and overview of non-economic losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The incidence of non-economic losses 
65.  Non-economic losses can be described as occurring in three distinct areas: private 
individuals, social items such as public goods and networks (connections between people) 
and the environment. Impacts to these areas can also give rise to economic losses and non-
economic losses in these areas can also result in losses in other areas; for example, damage 
to the environment can affect private individuals. 
66.  Many of the impacts of climate change on individuals will have direct economic 
effects. However, individuals may also suffer from non-economic losses in the form of loss 
of life and health, including mental health. 
67.  Non-economic losses occur in societies when non-economic public or cultural goods 
are damaged or when networks are damaged. A network is a set of connections between 
people. The main types of such losses are losses to cultural heritage and indigenous/local 
knowledge  and  other  social  capital.  These  items  are  shared  across  all  individuals  in  a 
society and so, while it is ultimately individuals who will incur the loss as explained in 
chapter 0 above, the incidence of the damage is social. 
68.  The impacts of climate change on the environment will tend to be non-economic 
because environmental goods and services are often not formally part of the economy. The 
environment can be considered to have two  main assets  that are susceptible to climate 
change: biodiversity and ecosystems. 
69.  Figure 8 illustrates how  types of non-economic losses discussed in chapter III.0 
above are directly linked to individuals, social items and the environment. There will be 
indirect effects, as discussed in chapter III.3 above, which means that effects can influence 
one another; for example, a loss of biodiversity can affect elements of health. However, 
these indirect linkages are complex and therefore not presented in the figure for clarity. 
Box 2 
Chapter summary 
-  Non-economic losses occur in three distinct areas: private individuals, society and 
the environment. More specifically, non-economic losses can be understood as 
losses of, inter alia, life, health, territory, cultural heritage, indigenous/local 
knowledge, biodiversity and ecosystem services. 
-  Non-economic losses may occur through many channels. They may be related to 
both slow onset impacts (e.g. the loss of territory to sea level rise) and extreme 
events (e.g. loss of life in a cyclone). The loss may be directly linked to climate 
change (e.g. loss of ecosystems) or occur indirectly (e.g. malnutrition as a 
consequence of impacts in the agriculture sector). 
-  The distinction between non-economic loss and economic loss will sometimes be 
blurred. For example, damage to natural ecosystems is primarily a non-economic 
loss, since ecosystem services are rarely traded on the market. However, there may 
be market impacts if the services the ecosystem provides are used as inputs to the 
market economy, such as food, fibre and water storage.  
22 
 
Figure 8 
Suggested types of non-economic loss can be categorized according to their direct occurrence  
on individuals, society and the environment 
 
Note: Non-economic losses can have indirect impacts across individuals, society and environment. This figure 
displays the interlinkages of direct non-economic losses. 
The main types of non-economic losses 
70.  The main types of non-economic loss described in this chapter are summarized in 
table 2, which also provides examples of these non-economic losses due to climate change. 
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  Table 2 
Summary of the main types of non-economic losses 
Types of non-economic loss  Description  Example of climate-related loss  Climate drivers  Approaches to valuation 
Loss of life 
Loss of life is a clear 
example of a non-economic 
loss as it is a violation of 
the right to life 
The Russian heatwave in 2010 may have 
claimed 55,000 lives (World Bank, 2012). 
Torrential rainfall in December 2010 in Central 
and South America caused flooding and 
landslides in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic 
of), Colombia and Panama, which killed over 
100 people (NOAA, 2010) 
Direct losses from extreme 
weather events, indirect losses 
arising from climate-induced 
deterioration in health (see health 
for climate drivers of these) 
Number of lives lost is a clear metric on its 
own but it can be monetized using value of 
a statistical life methods. However, such 
methods of monetization may not be 
suitable in the context of a global threat 
such as climate change 
Health 
Human health incorporates 
physical, mental and social 
well-being and its non-
economic value stems from 
its contribution to well-
being 
Epidemiological evidence has pointed to a 
widespread environmental cause for recent 
outbreaks of cholera, rather than a point source 
contamination. For example, cholera epidemics 
are associated with positive surface temperature 
anomalies in coastal and inland lake waters 
(McMichael et al., 2003) 
Extreme air temperature, extreme 
weather events, floods and 
droughts, climatic effects on 
agriculture, spread of infectious 
disease vectors and reduction in 
cold weather 
Disability adjusted life-years are an 
established and widely used method of 
measuring health impacts in terms of years 
of healthy life lost. Health impacts tend not 
to be monetized, but it is possible 
Human mobility 
Displacement is the clearest 
case of non-economic loss 
in the continuum of human 
mobility as non-economic 
items, such as security, 
dignity and agency, are 
impaired by displacement 
Permanent relocation plans identified in IDMC 
and OCHA (2009) consider the forced 
displacement of the 2,000 inhabitants of the 
Tulun (Carteret) and 400 of the Takuu 
(Mortlock) islands in Papua New Guinea. Over 
27,000 people were forced from their homes in 
Fiji by two flood disasters and the impact of 
Cyclone Evan in 2012. Cyclone Evan further 
displaced over 7,000 people in Samoa, where 
another 3,700 people were forced from their 
homes by floods (IDMC, 2013) 
Extreme weather events, 
particularly hydrometeorological 
events, and slow onset events past 
a tipping point can result in 
displacement 
The direct non-economic loss of 
displacement is intangible but the number 
of climate change-related displaced people 
can indicate the scale of the issue, while 
assessment of the risk of displacement can 
allow people to internally value potential 
loss and damage 
Territory 
Loss of territory has non-
economic value because 
territory provides 
sovereignty and a sense of 
place 
Predicted changes in sea level rise could 
inundate or increase the salinity of 12–15 per 
cent of agricultural land in the Nile Delta 
(Stabinsky and Hoffmaister, 2012) 
Inundation results in outright loss 
of territory, while other slow onset 
events, such as drought, 
salinization, land degradation and 
desertification, can make territory 
uninhabitable 
Sovereignty and sense of place have 
intangible benefits that are unique to a 
context and so valuation can be challenging 
due to subsequent incomparability; as a 
result, assessment may be best achieved 
through recognition of when territory is 
lost or threatened  
 
Cultural heritage 
Cultural heritage can be 
tangible, for example 
historic buildings, or 
intangible, such as a body 
of traditional knowledge. 
Tangible cultural heritage is 
considered here. It has non-
economic value because it 
contributes to social 
cohesion and identity 
Thousands of the distinctive houses of New 
Orleans, home to one of the largest collections 
of historic buildings in the USA, were damaged 
by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
A World Heritage site, known as the megalithic 
circles of Senegal and Gambia, is threatened by 
drought, which causes stone to crack 
(Berenfeld, 2008) 
Extreme weather events, such as 
floods and storms 
Slow onset events can also 
damage cultural heritage as 
changing climate conditions put 
structures under stress 
The risk of physical damage to cultural 
heritage can be estimated; however, the 
value of such damage is challenging to 
assess because the cultural items are unique 
and can have both use and non-use value 
Indigenous and local 
knowledge and other social 
capital 
Indigenous and local 
knowledge is knowledge 
that is unique to a particular 
cultural group or 
community. It often has 
strong links with the 
environment and is valuable 
as it is often spiritual, 
cultural and practical and 
contributes to social 
cohesion and identity 
The traditional cattle and goat farming practices 
of the indigenous peoples in Africa’s Kalahari 
Basin are being negatively affected by 
increasing temperatures and wind speed and 
increased desertification. Mild winters in 
Finland, Norway and Sweden prevent reindeer 
from accessing lichen, which is a vital food 
source. The subsequent decline in reindeer 
numbers and difficulties in reindeer herding is 
damaging Saami culture and communities as 
reindeer are central to their way of life (United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, 2008) 
Slow onset events change the 
characteristics of an environment 
and so undermine the basis of 
indigenous and local knowledge 
Valuation of indigenous and local 
knowledge must consider that the value of 
such knowledge is derived from 
interlinkages with and the cohesiveness of 
social networks 
Biodiversity 
Biodiversity describes the 
diversity among living 
organisms. It may have 
intrinsic value and species 
may have a right to exist. 
Biodiversity also provides a 
stock of genetic material 
and underpins many 
ecosystem services 
In the forests of Costa Rica, over the past 20 
years 110 endemic frog species (approximately 
two thirds) have become extinct. Research has 
shown that increasing temperatures have 
increased the prevalence of a fungus that is 
lethal to many frog species (UNESCO, 2007a) 
Climate change alters the 
conditions an ecosystem is suited 
to, so as the climate changes the 
ecosystem will shift to a new area, 
where the climate has the right 
conditions. If the ecosystem 
cannot shift, it will fail and 
transform into a different, often 
degraded, ecosystem 
Measurement of biodiversity, let alone 
valuation, is complex. Common metrics 
assess the richness of species in an area and 
also the number of threatened species. 
While biodiversity may have intrinsic 
value, identifying the instrumental value of 
the ecosystem services biodiversity 
provides is the primary approach to 
valuation  
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Ecosystem services 
Ecosystems can be thought 
of as providing four main 
types of services: 
supporting, provisioning, 
regulating and cultural. 
Provisioning services, such 
as the supply of food, 
timber, fuel and water, 
often have a market value, 
although failure of these 
services can cause non-
economic losses. 
Supporting, regulating and 
cultural services tend to be 
non-economic services 
Globally, coral reefs are threatened by ocean 
acidification due to absorption of CO2. Coral 
reefs support marine and coastal ecosystems 
and provide shoreline protection, tourism, 
aesthetic and cultural services. Estimates of the 
benefits of healthy coral reefs are high. 
Estimates of benefits in South Asia are USD 
23,100 to USD 270,000 per km
2 depending on 
the reef. As coral reefs die these benefits will be 
lost (TEEB, 2009) 
Ecosystem services can be 
affected by changes in biodiversity 
as this is the natural capital from 
which ecosystem services flow 
Slow onset events, such as 
temperature and precipitation 
changes, are particularly 
disruptive to supporting and 
regulating services 
Extreme weather events can 
damage the ecosystems that 
provide cultural, recreational and 
spiritual services 
Ecosystem services can be valued using 
revealed and stated-preference methods to 
estimate a monetary value for the service; 
estimates from one location can be 
transferred to other locations 
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1.  Loss of life 
71.  Loss of life is a clear example of a non-economic loss and has a simple and powerful 
unit of account. The right to life is widely recognized as a fundamental human right. As a 
result, loss of life is a clear damage and accounting for loss of life by simply counting the 
number of lives lost is a powerful metric. 
72.  Climate change may result in loss of life in direct ways, for example due to extreme 
weather events, or indirectly, for example through malnutrition as a result of food shortages 
arising from declining agricultural productivity due to slow and incremental changes in 
climate.  The  attribution  of  loss  of  life  to  extreme  weather  events  is  relatively 
straightforward, although gaps in understanding remain. Attribution of loss of life due to 
slow onset events and/or indirect impacts is far more uncertain. This is because many more 
factors aside from the climate event may have contributed to the loss of life in the case of 
an indirect impact than in the case of a direct impact. 
73.  Loss of life can be valued in monetary terms based on observed choices in everyday 
life that people make to expose themselves to risks of fatality so as to gain material benefit. 
Such estimates are known as the value of a statistical life. These estimates may not be 
appropriate in the context of a global threat such as climate change as they depend, inter 
alia, on the income of the population from which the estimate is derived (Viscusi and Aldy, 
2003). As incomes vary significantly across the world this implies a variation in the value 
of a statistical life. This may be incompatible with the view that each person has an equal 
right to life and therefore the loss of a life is of equal significance around the world. 
2.  Health 
74.  Human health has many facets. The World Health Organization (WHO) uses the 
following definition: “health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being 
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (IHC, 1946). Despite its many aspects, 
which  are  often  of  intangible  value,  there  has  been  significant  work  on  valuing  health 
impacts  in  general,  given  its  centrality  to  human  life  and  the  need  to  allocate  scarce 
resources. 
75.  Climate change can affect health in a variety of ways. The WHO has identified the 
following (WHO, 2011): 
(a)  Extreme air temperatures: heatwaves are a direct contributor to deaths from 
cardiovascular and respiratory disease; increased temperatures can also exacerbate pollution 
and aeroallergens, such as pollen; 
(b)  Extreme weather events: floods and storms can cause injury and loss of life 
and also damage property, health services and mental health. A lack of shelter and adequate 
care,  especially  in  the  aftermath  of  an  extreme  weather  event,  can  damage  health; 
displacement  and  forced  migration  to  avoid  extreme  weather  events  can  also  increase 
stresses on health; 
(c)  Floods and droughts: aside from  the risk of injury  from  extreme  weather 
events,  floods  and  droughts  can  reduce  and  degrade  fresh  water  supplies,  which  are 
essential to health and hygiene; contaminated water can also transmit infectious diseases; 
(d)  Climatic  effects  on  agriculture:  decreasing  crop  yields  can  lead  to 
malnutrition, especially among populations that rely on subsistence farming; 
(e)  Potential spread of infectious disease vectors: insects that carry infectious 
diseases are sensitive to climate and so, as the climate changes, their range may change, 
introducing infectious diseases to new areas;  
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(f)  Reduction  in  cold  weather:  some  populations  in  higher  latitudes  of  the 
northern hemisphere are expected to benefit from a reduction in cold-related illness and 
death as average temperatures increase. 
76.  The impact of climate change on human health is thought to have been low so far, 
claiming, in 2004, 0.2 per cent of global deaths and 0.4 per cent of global DALYs; almost 
all of these  losses occurred in low and  middle income countries (WHO, 2009). Future 
health impacts arising due to climate change will depend significantly on adaptation, as 
socioeconomic  conditions,  health-care  systems  and  levels  of  disaster  risk  management 
heavily influence health outcomes. The WHO estimates that 14–47 per cent of the annual 
cost  of  adaptation  will  be  health  related  (WHO,  2011).  If  resources  for  adaptation  are 
insufficient then loss and damage due to health impacts will occur. 
77.  Health impacts are often measured using DALYs. For example, this is the metric 
used in the WHO Global Burden of Disease study (World Health Organization, 2009). A 
DALY can be thought of as one lost year of ‘healthy’ life. A DALY is calculated as the 
sum of the years of life lost and years lost due to disability. Years of life lost is a measure 
of premature mortality and is a count of the years before an ideal life expectancy in which 
death occurs. Years lost due to disability is a measure of the burden of disability due to 
disease on quality of life. It is calculated by multiplying the average duration of the disease 
until  remission  or  death  by  a  disability  weight.  DALYs  are  not  without  criticism,  for 
example regarding the method of determining disability weights, but DALYs, or similar 
metrics, such as quality adjusted life years, are frequently used in health policy.  
3.  Human mobility 
78.  Human  mobility  can  be  viewed  as  a  continuum  from  completely  voluntary 
movements to completely forced migrations (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
2012). The Cancun Adaptation Framework recognizes displacement, migration and planned 
relocation as forms of human mobility that can be induced by climate change.
1 While there 
is no definition under the Convention, migration tends to refer to voluntary movement, 
while displacement tends to refer to forced movement. 
79.  Displacement is the clearest case of loss and damage across the continuum of human 
mobility, although other forms of human mobility could be considered as a type of loss and 
damage.
2 Loss and damage can result from displacement, for example displacement can 
cause  distress  and  a  loss  of  health  or  social  networks.  However,  displacement  also 
constitutes a unique type of loss and damage in itself and is not just a cause of other types 
of loss and damage. It is displacement as a (non-economic) type of loss and damage in 
itself that is the focus of this technical paper. Displacement can result in a loss of security 
(including legal rights) and agency (the ability to control one’s location and livelihood), 
among other things.
3 In the same way that a loss of health is a type of loss and damage 
because  health  is  important  to  well-being,  displacement  is  a  type  of  loss  and  damage 
because security and agency, which are lost due to displacement, are important to well-
being.  Furthermore,  such  loss  and  damage  of  displacement  is  a  non-economic  loss  as 
security and agency are non-economic items. The economic losses of displacement, such as 
the loss of possessions, and indirect non-economic losses, such as loss of health and social 
networks, should be understood as losses from displacement. 
                                                            
 
1  Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 14(f). 
 
2  For example, decision 3/CP.18, paragraph 7(f)(vi), recognizes migration, displacement and human 
mobility as issues of loss and damage. 
 
3  This is not a complete list of the losses that are a result of displacement and further research and 
consensus is required to expand this list.  
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80.  Displacement is described as the clearest case of mobility-related loss and damage 
for two main reasons. First, because it is clear that it directly harms security and agency, 
among other things. Second, displacement is also a clear example of the potential limits of 
adaptation and, as explained in chapter 0 above, loss and damage can be understood as 
harm arising from the physical impacts of climate change that are not mitigated or adapted 
to. For other types of human mobility, such as voluntary migration and planned relocation, 
context is required to assess the extent to which the acts themselves are a form of loss and 
damage. Voluntary migration and planned relocation tend to be identified as adaptation 
measures, and therefore they reduce exposure to some types of loss and damage. However, 
that is not to say that they cannot be harmful in themselves in some contexts. For example, 
planned relocation may impair agency if it is against the will of the residents. As voluntary 
migration  and  planned  relocation  can  be  considered  forms  of  adaptation,  rather  than 
responses to the limits of adaptation , their status as a type of loss and damage is further 
complicated. Trapped populations are also an unclear case. These are groups of people 
whose mobility is restricted, and so cannot migrate as a form of adaptation but nor can they 
be displaced (Warner et al., 2013), despite potentially suffering human mobility-related loss 
and damage. Overall, human mobility is a continuum and loss and damage is not clearly 
defined  and  so,  while  displacement  is  the  clearest  case  of  loss  and  damage  in  human 
mobility, it is not necessarily the only case. 
81.  Human mobility can be induced by both slow onset and extreme weather events. 
Extreme  weather  events  can  cause  displacement  while  the  risk  of  them  can  induce 
migration  or  planned  relocation.  Slow  onset  events  can  induce  migration  and  planned 
relocation as forms of adaptation to the slow onset event and can also cause displacement 
when the stresses from a slow onset event reach a tipping point.
4 Climate and weather-
related  disasters  currently  cause  significant  displacement,  with  an  estimated  32  million 
people displaced by these hazards in 2012, mostly for short periods of time within their 
national borders (IDMC, 2013). However, it should be noted that there is currently a lack of 
clear evidence systematically linking climate variability and migration, although there are 
clear  instances  of  extreme  hydrometeorological  events  resulting  in  displacement 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012). 
82.  The non-economic losses of displacement are intangible and therefore the value of 
the losses is hard to measure. However, the physical number of displaced people can be 
identified and this can provide a guide to the scale of the issue. That said, measurement of 
climate  change  related  displacement  suffers  from  a  lack  of  standard  concepts  and 
methodologies as well as barriers to data collection. Assessment and presentation of the risk 
of displacement can also go some way to identifying the potential loss and damage due to 
displacement,  even  if  this  loss  and  damage  is  not  explicitly  valued.  Indeed.  full 
quantification is likely to be inaccurate if not impossible; instead identifying and educating 
about the risk of displacement can allow people to determine their own valuations and bring 
this risk into their own decision-making. 
4.  Territory 
83.  Territory is an area of land, and associated exclusive economic zone (EEZ), that is 
under the jurisdiction of a State. Land provides economic benefits; for example, it can be 
cultivated or built on and provides resources, such as those in an EEZ. It also provides non-
economic benefits; for example, it can host ecosystems or be an area of outstanding natural 
beauty.  Territory  can  also  have  non-economic  value  simply  because  it  is  an  area  that 
belongs to a group and so forms part of that group’s identity. This sovereignty and sense of 
                                                            
 
4  Owing to the multicausal nature of human mobility generally, distinguishing such tipping points can 
be very difficult. For further discussion on this topic in the context of climate change see Hugo (2010) 
and Warner et al. (2013).   
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place are the non-economic benefits that are the focus of this chapter. Sovereignty describes 
the  ability  of  the  group  in  control  of  the  territory  to  self-determination.  In  contrast  to 
sovereignty, which is the characteristic of a society, a sense of place is felt by individuals. It 
describes the importance that an individual ascribes to an area and the way in which the 
area forms part of their identity. 
84.  Slow onset events can result in a physical loss of territory through inundation due to 
sea level rise. Deltaic nations and small island developing States face the greatest risk of 
this,  with  atoll  countries  possibly  facing  a  loss  of  sovereignty  due  to  sea  level  rise 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). Loss of territory could arguably also 
arise due to drought, salinization, land degradation and desertification. In these cases the 
ability to inhabit the territory is reduced even though the territory is still part of the land. 
The concept could have an even broader interpretation; for example, natural characteristics, 
such as flora and fauna, could change due to climate change and as a result the sense of 
place that some individuals have could also change if this sense is rooted in the flora and 
fauna of the area. 
85.  Sovereignty and sense of place are intangible benefits and so assessment of the risk 
of loss and damage due to a loss of territory is challenging. However, loss of sovereignty 
can be seen as a violation of the right to self-determination and so there is no need for a 
metric  beyond  the  fact  of  the  violation  itself.  Indeed,  the  loss  of  sovereignty  of  atoll 
countries  has  been  suggested  as  a  threshold  beyond  which  climate  change  can  be 
considered ‘dangerous’ (Barnett and Adger, 2003). Loss of a sense of place is not as clearly 
defined as loss of sovereignty, nor can the costs of losing a sense of place be as clearly 
communicated, as each experience is unique. As a result, assessing the non-economic loss 
arising from the loss of a sense of place is very difficult and the most that may be achieved 
is to recognize that such a loss is likely to occur. 
5.  Cultural heritage 
86.  Tangible cultural heritage “refers to monuments, groups of buildings and sites with 
historical,  aesthetic,  archaeological,  scientific,  ethnological  or  anthropological  value” 
(UNESCO, 2008). Cultural heritage can also include intangible heritage, considered to be a 
legacy of practices, expressions, knowledge and skills of a community (UNESCO, 2013). 
Physical  cultural  heritage  is  the  focus  of  this  chapter.  Intangible  heritage  could  be 
considered part of social capital, which is considered in chapter IV.B.6 below. 
87.  Climate  change  can  threaten  cultural  heritage  through  extreme  weather  events, 
which may destroy artefacts and buildings, often through flooding and storms. Slow onset 
events  can  also  damage  cultural  heritage  as  changing  climate  conditions  put  structures 
under stress. For example, heritage buildings tend to be made of more porous materials and 
are not as sealed from the elements as modern buildings (UNESCO, 2007b). This means 
they  can  be  more  susceptible  to  changes  in  temperature  and  humidity,  effects  that  the 
Climate for Culture project in the European Union is investigating. The project is using 
computer simulations to assess the effect of such changes on the structure and stability of 
historic buildings and the collections of artefacts within them (Climate for Culture, 2012). 
88.  As  described  above,  the  risk  of  physical  damage  to  cultural  heritage  can  be 
estimated. However, assessing the loss of value from such physical damage is harder to 
gauge. Cultural heritage provides an intangible benefit with no clear unit of measurement. 
For example, UNESCO World Heritage Sites are those with ‘outstanding universal value’, 
which is judged by experts according to a list of criteria developed by the World Heritage 
Committee  (UNESCO,  2012).  In  addition  to  this,  the  non-economic  loss  from  the 
destruction of cultural heritage is particularly hard to judge because cultural heritage may 
have non-use value. That is to say that value may often be derived by people simply from 
the continued existence of the cultural item and its contribution to their cultural identity  
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rather than from visiting it. So assessing losses from visitor numbers may not be reliable. 
Furthermore, items of cultural heritage are unique and irreplaceable and therefore their 
value  cannot  be  judged  from  assessments  of  similar  items  or  through  the  cost  of 
replacement. 
6.  Indigenous and local knowledge and other social capital 
89.  Indigenous and local knowledge is knowledge that is unique to a particular cultural 
group or community. It is often knowledge of the environment or knowledge developed 
with close reference to the environment. Such knowledge is valuable as it is often spiritual, 
cultural and practical and contributes to social cohesion and identity. It can be considered 
as a part of social capital, which describes “networks together with shared norms, values 
and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (OECD, 2007). 
90.  A changing climate can affect indigenous and local knowledge as it changes the 
environment on which such knowledge is based. If climate change invalidates or prevents 
the development or transmission of knowledge then this can affect the spiritual and cultural 
well-being of the community. It can also have economic impacts; for example, indigenous 
knowledge is often used to forecast weather and determine when to plant crops. Indigenous 
knowledge  also  benefits  wider  groups;  for  example,  it  is  often  used  to  preserve 
biodiversity
5  or  to  identify  medicines.  Indigenous  knowledge  is  also  often  valuable  in 
adaptation planning and so a loss of such knowledge can increase vulnerability to climate 
change, which may lead to other types of losses. Indigenous knowledge is particularly at 
threat from climate change as indigenous groups tend to live in climate-sensitive areas, 
such as the  Arctic,  margins  of deserts, rainforests and at high-altitude regions. Climate 
change can also affect broader social capital by breaking or stressing social network, by, for 
example, displacement, forced migration or resource shortages. 
91.  While indigenous and local knowledge and other social capital can be considered to 
be at risk of loss and damage it is hard to judge the magnitude of possible impacts. This is 
because these sources of social value are not countable. There are no units for the quantity 
of social capital and indeed it is a misconception to think of social capital as a discrete, 
countable resource. Instead, social capital should be understood to be a holistic resource, 
where value is derived from the interlinkages and cohesiveness of the network. Also, when 
judging the risk of loss and damage to social capital, vulnerability to climate change should 
be considered. Social capital can adapt to circumstances, and is continually evolving, and 
can also be transmitted. So, for some communities, social capital may be robust to the 
effects of climate change, or the basis of social capital could shift away from climate-
sensitive sectors. Such robustness is unlikely to apply to indigenous communities due to an 
emphasis  on  preserving  tradition  and  on  the  environment  and  due  to  difficulties  in 
transmitting indigenous knowledge. 
7.  Biodiversity 
92.  Biodiversity  means  “the  variability  among  living  organisms  from  all  sources 
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species 
and of ecosystems” (United Nations, 1992). Biodiversity has non-economic value because 
the simple existence of biodiversity can be of intrinsic value to people and species may be 
considered to have a right to exist. Biodiversity also provides a stock of genetic material 
and  underpins  many  ecosystem  services  (secretariat  of  the  Convention  on  Biological 
Diversity, 2010, p.94). 
                                                            
 
5  The value of indigenous knowledge in the protection of biodiversity is recognized in article 8(j) of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity <http://www.cbd.int/traditional/>.  
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93.  Before considering the impact of climate change on biodiversity it is important to 
consider  the  complexity  of  measuring  any  changes  in  biodiversity.  The  Streamlining 
European  Biodiversity  Indicators  2010  programme  has  26  indicators  of  biodiversity 
(European  Environment  Agency,  n.d.),  chosen  from  about  200  possible  indicators 
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2008). The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Environmental Outlook considers four indicators: 
mean species abundance (MSA),
6 threatened species, forest area and marine stocks (OECD, 
2012). So understanding the impact of climate change on biodiversity requires assessment 
across a number of metrics. 
94.  Regardless of the metric, biodiversity is, in general, under threat, and climate change 
is likely to provide significant stress in addition to the strains already arising on biodiversity 
due to economic development and population growth. Climate change alters the conditions 
an ecosystem is suited to. So as the climate changes the ecosystem will shift to a new area, 
where the climate has the right conditions; or, if the ecosystem cannot shift, it will fail and 
transform into a different, often degraded, ecosystem. The OECD estimated that “climate 
change is projected to become an increasingly important pressure in the baseline,
7 driving 
just over 40 per cent of additional global MSA loss between 2010 and 2050” (OECD, 
2012). With regard to threatened species, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
states that “approximately 20–30 per cent of plant and animal species assessed so far are 
likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average temperature exceed 
1.5–2.5°C” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). 
95.  Valuation of changes in biodiversity is challenging as its intrinsic value can be hard 
to  articulate.  A  major  global  initiative  on  TEEB
8  concluded  that  focusing  on  the 
instrumental  value  of  biodiversity  can  be  effective,  stating  that  “an  ecosystem  service 
perspective should inform economic valuations of biodiversity, focusing on how decision 
makers  can  include  the  benefits  and  costs  of  conserving  or  restoring  nature  in  their 
considerations” (TEEB, 2010b). Valuation of ecosystem services is discussed in chapter 
IV.B.8 below. 
96.  Valuation  of  changes  in  biodiversity  is  especially  challenging  and  important  in 
developing countries. Biodiversity hotspots tend to be in developing countries, as figure 9 
shows, and so the greatest burden of valuation may occur in areas with a low capacity for 
such valuation. Not only is biodiversity often greatest in developing countries, but people 
tend to have a greater reliance on the ecosystem services that biodiversity  supports. In 
addition, methods of valuation are often designed in developed countries and may not be 
appropriate in the developing country context, often for institutional reasons, such as the 
predominance of the informal economy over the formal, as well as cultural reasons. As a 
result,  participatory  methods  of  valuation,  rather  than  economic  methods,  have  been 
suggested in such contexts (TEEB, 2010a). 
                                                            
 
6  MSA represents the average response of the total set of species belonging to an ecosystem to a change 
in their environment. As such it describes species richness; a biome achieving an MSA score of 1 is in 
a pristine state, with full species richness, while a biome scoring 0 is a biome devoid of original 
species. The abundance of species in a pristine state, that is a state with minimal human interference, 
is often established via modelling techniques. 
 
7  The baseline is a scenario assuming no new policies for environmental issues, addressed in the OECD 
Environmental Outlook to 2050. 
 
8  See <http://www.teebweb.org>.  
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Figure 9 
Many biodiversity hotspots are in developing countries and are at risk from  
ecosystems shifting in response to climate change 
 
Note: The map shows the overlap between biodiversity hotspots, regions with exceptional concentrations of 
endemic species undergoing exceptional loss of habitat (Myers et al., 2000) and the projected changes in terrestrial 
ecosystems by 2100 relative to the 2000, as presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in Fischlin 
et al., (2007), figure 4.3(a), p. 238. The changes should be taken as only indicative of the range of possible ecosystem 
changes and include gains or losses of forest cover, grassland, shrubland and woodland, herbaceous cover and desert 
amelioration. 
Source: World Bank (2009) based on Myers et al. (2000) and Fischlin et al. (2007). 
8.  Ecosystem services 
97.  Marine and terrestrial ecosystems can be thought of as providing four main types of 
services:  supporting,  provisioning,  regulating  and  cultural  (Millennium  Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005). This classification of services comes from the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment and has been widely adopted. Provisioning services, such as the supply of food, 
timber, fuel and water, often have a market value. However, supporting, regulating and 
cultural services tend to be non-economic services. Supporting services describe the role of 
ecosystems  in  the  various  environmental  cycles,  such  as  the  nutrient  cycle  and 
photosynthesis.  Regulating  services  describe  the  role  of  ecosystems  in  regulating  the 
climate, floods and other extremes of nature. Cultural services are the spiritual, aesthetic, 
educational and recreational uses that people derive from ecosystems.  
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Figure 9 
Ecosystem services can be mapped to constituents of human well-being 
 
Source: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment ( 2005). 
98.  The value of ecosystem services has been the subject of major research programmes 
in recent years and conceptual frameworks and valuation methods have been developed. 
Ecosystem  services  can  be  linked  to  constituents  of  human  well-being,  as  figure  10 
illustrates. These services can also be described as having ecological, sociocultural and 
economic benefits and values (TEEB, 2010a). Ecological values describe the support that 
aspects of ecosystems provide to each other. For example, trees can control erosion and 
animals are part of food chains. Such support makes an ecosystem resilient and so enables 
the  continued  enjoyment  of  sociocultural  and  economic  benefits.  Sociocultural  benefits 
reflect the contribution of ecosystems to people’s mental, cultural and spiritual well-being 
and to their sense of place and identity. The economic value of ecosystem services can 
come from a broad range of sources. It can come from the use of ecosystems, such as food 
and  recreation,  or  from  non-use,  such  as  satisfaction  in  preservation,  either  for  future 
generations or for the sake of preservation in its own right. The sum of these non-market 
sources of value is known as the total economic value, which is explained in more detail in 
chapter 0 above. 
99.  Climate change can result in non-economic losses from ecosystems in a number of 
ways. The biodiversity that underpins an ecosystem can be affected, as described in chapter 
IV.B.5 above. In the same way that destruction of physical capital can lead to a reduced  
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flow of production, so can destruction of natural capital lead to a lower flow of ecosystem 
services. Ecosystem services can also be affected through other mechanisms. Slow onset 
events,  such  as  temperature  and  precipitation  changes,  can  disrupt  supporting  and 
regulating services, while extreme weather events can damage the ecosystems that provide 
cultural, recreational and spiritual services. Provisioning services will be affected, primarily 
in changes in fish catch, yields of crops and changes in growth patterns of forests. As 
previously mentioned, provisioning services often have economic value, for example the 
revenue from the sale of fish and agricultural produce, and so these losses are economic 
losses.  However,  for  subsistence  farmers  and  other  vulnerable  people,  a  reduction  in 
provisioning services can threaten food security and the impact this has on well-being is a 
non-economic loss. 
100.  There are a variety of ways for valuing changes in ecosystem services in monetary 
terms.  These  methods  are  described  in  more  detail  in  chapter  V.2  below.  However, 
applying these techniques can be challenging, especially in developing countries. TEEB 
(2010b) suggests three steps that can be taken, noting that steps two and three may not be 
appropriate in contexts  where there are capacity constraints, for example in developing 
countries,  and  that  step  one,  simply  identifying  affected  ecosystem  services,  may  be 
sufficient. The three steps are the following: 
(a)  For each decision identify and assess the full range of ecosystem services 
affected and the implications for different groups in society; 
(b)  Estimate and demonstrate the value of ecosystem services; 
(c)  Capture the value of ecosystem services and seek solutions. 
V.  Methods for assessing non-economic losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3 
Chapter summary 
-  There is a lot of experience worldwide with the assessment and valuation of non-
economic impacts of human development and natural phenomena, ranging from 
environmental impact assessment of local infrastructure projects, to climate change 
impacts, adaptation and vulnerability assessment at the global scale. 
 
-  However, assessment and valuation of non-economic impacts remains very difficult, 
owing to the many uncertainties involved and the essential role of value judgements. 
These difficulties are usually magnified where analytical capacity is limited. 
 
-  The paper identifies four broad categories of valuation technique: economic 
valuation, multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA), composite risk indices and 
qualitative/semi-quantitative methods. 
 
These methods differ in the extent to which they attempt to make non-economic 
effects commensurable with economic effects, for aggregation into an overall value 
for a course of action such as a policy. Economic valuation seeks to put money 
values on non-economic losses, while MCDA and composite risk indices use formal 
scoring and weighting. Qualitative/semi-quantitative methods do not attempt to 
aggregate to the same extent, so it is up to the users of the analysis to compare and 
evaluate the many effects of policy choices. There are advantages and disadvantages 
to all of these approaches.  
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Frameworks for assessment and valuation of non-economic losses 
101.  Chapter V.0 presents a review of existing frameworks that have been used to assess 
and value the non-economic effects of human development and natural phenomena, with 
the aim of identifying lessons for assessing and valuing non-economic losses from climate 
change. 
102.  The assessment of non-economic losses associated with climate change faces many 
challenges,  but  it  is  by  no  means  the  first  time  that  policymakers  have  confronted  the 
question of how to take into account the non-economic effects of human development and 
natural  phenomena.  Rather,  over  several  decades  and  in  many  countries,  experience  of 
assessment has been accumulated through the assessment of the environmental and social 
impacts  (usually  alongside  the  economic  impacts)  of  new  economic  development,  of 
existing economic activity and of natural environmental phenomena. 
103.  Many frameworks have been developed for these purposes, including the following: 
(a)  EIA; 
(b)  SEA; 
(c)  Environmental risk assessment; 
(d)  Economic appraisal/CBA; 
(e)  Wealth/capital accounting; 
(f)  Vulnerability assessment; 
(g)  Disaster loss/damage assessment; 
(h)  CCIAV. 
104.  These  frameworks  are  described  in  more  detail  in  the  annex.  They  have  been 
developed for different purposes and are summarized in table 3 . 
Table 3 
Relevant frameworks for the assessment of the non-economic effects of human  
development and natural phenomena 
Assessment framework  What is its purpose?  How does it incorporate non-economic effects? 
Environmental 
impact assessment  
Ex ante assessment of environmental impacts 
of local/regional development projects and of 
economic and social impacts as support to 
planning/zoning decisions 
Development projects always have non-
economic effects, which should be 
measured and valued alongside economic 
effects before making decisions on 
whether to permit development 
Strategic 
environmental 
assessment 
Ex ante assessment of environmental impacts of 
national/regional policies, plans and 
programmes, known as ‘strategic actions’ and of 
economic and social impacts as support to 
strategic decision-making 
Strategic actions always have non-
economic effects, which should be 
measured and valued alongside economic 
effects before choosing a policy, plan or 
programme 
Environmental risk 
assessment 
Ex ante assessment of human and environmental 
effects of hazardous production processes and 
products as support to planning and permitting 
decisions 
Hazardous production processes and 
products pose non-economic risks to the 
natural environment and human health, 
which environmental risk assessment aims 
to quantify as an input to planning and  
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Assessment framework  What is its purpose?  How does it incorporate non-economic effects? 
permitting decisions 
Cost–benefit 
analysis 
Assessment of monetary costs and benefits of 
policies, plans, programmes and/or projects, 
either ex ante to aid planning/strategic decision-
making, or ex post to inform on performance of 
existing measures 
Many of the benefits and costs of policies, 
plans, programmes and projects are non-
economic, however, cost–benefit analysis 
aims to give them parity of esteem by 
putting a monetary value on them 
Wealth/capital 
accounting 
Comprehensive wealth/capital accounting seeks 
to understand how (typically) nations manage 
their asset bases, with a view to assessing 
whether they are developing sustainably  
The national asset base includes not only 
economic capital, but also non-economic 
capital such as natural capital. Non-
economic capital needs to be assigned a 
monetary value if the overall 
wealth/savings position is to be measured 
formally 
Vulnerability 
assessment 
Assessment of the vulnerability of societies at 
multiple scales to natural environmental 
pressures, alongside other stressors, often as an 
input to disaster risk reduction initiatives 
Vulnerability is usually conceived to have 
multiple determinants, some of which are 
non-economic (e.g. nutrition levels, 
strength of social networks) 
Disaster 
loss/Damage 
assessment 
Ex post assessment of the impacts of natural 
disasters, especially economic costs 
Natural disasters have non-economic 
effects that could be quantified and even 
monetized, although in practice this is 
rarely done 
Climate change 
impacts, adaptation 
and vulnerability 
assessment  
Assessment of the impacts of climate change on 
societies at multiple scales, either to aid 
adaptation planning or to understand benefits of 
mitigation 
Impacts of, and vulnerability to, climate 
change include non-economic dimensions 
Source: Authors. 
105.  EIA is one of the most widely used frameworks in this list. First developed in the 
United States of America in the late 1960s, it is now used as a means of systematic ex ante 
assessment of the impacts of development projects such as dams and roads in over 100 
countries worldwide, including a number of least developed countries, as well as by various 
multilateral institutions. Best practice is the holistic assessment of the economic and non-
economic effects of a project. Moreover, given the large number of planning decisions 
where  EIA  is  appropriate,  the  framework  must  be  relatively  quick  and  easy  to  use.  In 
particular,  the  valuation  stage  of  EIA  is  often  based  on  simple  qualitative  or  semi-
quantitative methods, as explained in chapter V.0 below. 
106.  SEA builds on the foundations of EIA but is applied to strategic actions, such as 
choices by public authorities over what policies, plans and/or programmes to choose. While 
newer and less  widespread than EIA, it still aims to embed SEA in strategic decision-
making  by  national,  regional  and  local  governments  across  the  world.  The  nature  of 
strategic actions, unlike that of local development projects, requires that SEA methodology 
place more emphasis on complex, indirect effects on the environment and society. Even 
more so than in EIA, assessment and valuation in SEA tends to be relatively simple and 
non-quantitative.  
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107.  Environmental risk assessment has developed as a fairly specialized, science-based 
and engineering-based framework for the quantification of risks arising from hazardous 
production processes and products. It is the environment and human health that are subject 
to these risks, making them in large part non-economic. The environmental risk assessment 
framework offers a heavily quantitative, expert-driven model for the assessment of non-
economic losses from climate change, which may or may not be appropriate, but is in any 
case very different from EIA/SEA. The framework also places uncertainty centre stage in 
contrast to most other frameworks included in Table 3. 
108.  Economic  appraisal,  CBA  specifically,  is  widely  used  in  some  countries  and 
international organizations to inform policy, plan, programme and project choice,
9 or for ex 
post evaluation of measures taken. It has a history of application going back to the first half 
of the twentieth century. CBA involves the measurement and monetization of all the effects 
of  development.  Monetization  of  non-economic  effects  should  therefore  be  a  central 
element. Since market prices do not by definition exist for non-economic effects, these 
effects must be assigned ‘shadow prices’ using a variety of techniques. Such techniques are 
complicated and costly to apply, so assessing the possibility of transferring estimates made 
in other contexts is important. Chapter V.0 below discusses this in greater detail. 
109.  There is an increasing  focus in  many countries on expanded notions of national 
wealth and national accounts that do not just include narrow measures of economic output, 
savings and wealth, but also non-economic savings and sources of wealth, such as natural 
assets. The World Bank  has been a prominent advocate  of the approach and  measures 
comprehensive wealth and adjusted net savings for many countries, while the UN System 
of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) contains internationally agreed standards 
for keeping account of natural resources alongside the economy, including ,but not limited 
to, monetary accounting of natural resources. 
110.  Vulnerability assessment is a growing field, gaining importance owing to interest 
from  development  organizations  involved  in  disaster  risk  reduction  and  to  interest  in 
analysing  the  impacts  of  global  environmental  change.  Many  different  definitions  of 
vulnerability  exist,  though  most  of  them  have  in  common  a  focus  on  three  elements: 
exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. Sensitivity and adaptive capacity, in particular, 
have non-economic elements. Vulnerability assessment, then, involves the measurement of 
exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. A range of techniques exist from quantitative 
global risk indices to more qualitative community-based self-assessment. 
111.  Disaster loss/damage assessment takes place after a natural disaster and is intended 
to reveal the extent of losses, such as fatalities and economic losses, including insured and 
uninsured  losses.  It  is  often  conducted  as  a  rapid  survey  to  inform  responses  such  as 
humanitarian aid. 
112.  Recent years have witnessed an increase in the specific application of appraisal and 
assessment techniques to climate change impacts and adaptation planning, such as CCIAV, 
at multiple scales, from the global to the local. These come in a wide variety of forms, some 
of  which  are  impact-based  and  build  on  quantitative  simulation  modelling  (so-called 
integrated  assessment),  and  some  of  which  are  closer  in  tradition  to  vulnerability 
assessment. The techniques that have been developed are not new in the sense that ideas 
have been imported from other areas such as environmental assessment or vulnerability 
assessment, but the specific focus is climate change. 
                                                            
 
9  In principle, CBA, as a method or a tool, could be used as an element of, for instance, EIA or SEA, 
but in practice this tends not to be the case.  
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Valuing and evaluating non-economic losses 
113.  This  technical  paper  now  turns  to  the  specific  issue  of  valuation,  distilling  the 
experience from diverse assessment settings in chapter V.0 above into four different, broad 
valuation  methods:  (a)  economic  valuation,  (b)  MCDA,  (c)  risk  indices  and  (d) 
qualitative/semi-quantitative approaches. These methods are compared and contrasted, with 
strengths and weaknesses identified. 
114.  While  valuation  in  common  parlance  is  associated  with  money  and  therefore 
economic methods, a brief but broad definition of the act of valuation is, in fact, simply 
“comparing  objects”  (Dasgupta,  2001).  A  wider  range  of  approaches  is  thus  relevant. 
Evaluation is similarly just “comparing the relative merits of actions” (Dasgupta, op. cit.). 
115.  In the context of addressing non-economic losses associated with climate change 
impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change, (e)valuation is then the stage at which the significance of non-economic 
losses is defined and adaptation options can be compared on the basis of how much they 
reduce non-economic losses, and in how much their parameters, such as cost, diverge. 
2.  Economic valuation 
116.  Economic valuation for CBA or wealth/capital accounting involves valuing a change 
in the provision of a good or service or a change in the value of an asset, respectively, by 
multiplying  the  change  in  the  quantity  in  its  natural  unit  by  the  price  per  unit:  
price x quantity. 
117.  However, as discussed above market prices only exist for a subset, sometimes a 
limited one, of all of the goods, services and capital stocks affected by development. They 
do not by definition exist for non-economic goods, services and capital stocks. Therefore, 
the task is to infer so-called ‘shadow’ prices where market prices do not exist, i.e. in non-
market valuation. This is no small task; a sophisticated theoretical and practical framework 
has been developed for it, summarized in numerous textbooks, manuals and sets of official 
guidelines. The main methods of non-market valuation are (a) revealed preference methods 
and (b) stated preference methods. Given that (a) or (b) have already been used to generate 
values somewhere, it is also possible to use (c) benefits transfers in order to apply these 
values to new contexts without repeating the original valuation work. 
118.  Revealed  preference  methods  exploit  the  fact  that,  while  few  environmental  and 
social  goods/services  are  traded  explicitly  on  markets,  some  are  traded  implicitly  and 
therefore their value can be estimated by analysing actual market purchases of linked and 
related goods. The four principal methods of revealed preference valuation are summarized 
in table 4.  
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Table 4 
Revealed preference methods of economic valuation 
Method  Revealed behaviour  Conceptual framework  Applications 
Hedonic pricing  Land values; job 
choices 
Demand for 
differentiated 
products 
Land value and wage 
determinants 
Travel cost  Participation in 
recreation activity at 
chosen site 
Household 
production; 
complementary 
goods 
Recreational demand 
Averting 
behaviour/defensive 
expenditure 
Time costs; 
purchases to avoid 
harm 
Household 
production; 
substitute goods 
Health: morbidity 
and mortality 
Costs of illness  Expenditures to treat 
illness 
Treatment costs  Health: morbidity 
Source: Adapted from Pearce et al. (2006). 
119.  It is evident that revealed preference methods can be used for non-economic effects 
but only those which can be linked to actual market behaviour in a tractable way, e.g. 
health effects and the contribution of environmental goods and services to land values. The 
strength of revealed preference methods usually held to be that they are based on actual, 
rather  than  hypothetical,  market  behaviour,  thus  avoiding  various  biases  that  may  be 
present in making hypothetical purchases. 
120.  By contrast, hypothetical behaviour is the cornerstone of stated preference methods, 
which  use  questionnaire  surveys  (either  contingent  valuation  or  choice  experiments)  to 
analyse people’s future behaviour in a constructed market for a non-economic good/service. 
The constructed or ‘contingent’ market describes the good/service to be purchased and the 
institutional context behind its provision, the latter of which can have a strong effect on 
stated values.  
121.  Stated preference methods are more flexible than revealed preference methods, in 
that they can be used to capture almost any aspect of the economic value of non-market 
goods/services.  So  there  will  be  some  non-economic  effects  that  could  only  be  priced, 
directly or via benefits transfer, using stated preference valuation. In other cases, stated 
preference methods provide a rival approach to revealed preference methods, such as in 
quantifying the value of a statistical life/value of a life-year.  
122.  However,  the  hypothetical  nature  of  these  methods  is  the  major  concern  in 
judgements on whether the price estimates they yield are reliable and unbiased/valid. Much 
scepticism exists on this point, often well d, but it is worth noting that the use of such 
values has been subject to official, expert scrutiny and endorsed in policy settings in many 
countries (famously in 1993 by NOAA in valuing the environmental costs of the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill with a view to informing compensation requirements in the United States 
courts).  Furthermore,  interest  in  developing  the  science  has  led  to  the  publication  of 
thousands  of  studies  over  the  past  20–30  years,  so  these  biases  have  been  extremely 
thoroughly scrutinized relative to some weaknesses in other methods.  
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123.  The  Benefit  transfer  method  is  very  important  in  practice  given  the  time  and 
resources needed to conduct original revealed and stated preference studies. The method is 
difficult to apply correctly; account must be taken of the quality of the original estimates to 
be transferred and of differences in context (e.g. income), which should be controlled for 
quantitatively.  Therefore,  inaccuracy  is  a  major  concern;  it  rises  as  the  original  study 
becomes more dissimilar to the ‘site’ to which estimates are to be transferred. Nonetheless, 
Box 4 
Economic valuation in developing countries 
This box describes some prominent examples of economic valuation in developing 
countries. 
Reddy and Behera (2006) applied economic valuation to economic and non-economic 
losses associated with industrial water pollution in rural communities in India. They 
estimated costs associated with losses to agricultural production, human health and 
livestock through an analysis of household-level data, comparing an affected and a non-
affected village in Andhra Pradesh, South India. The non-economic losses were found to 
be the more significant losses, with direct impact on human health and livelihood. They 
were measured in terms of sick days and medical treatment required as a result of the 
consumption of polluted water. The net impact of pollution was estimated to be USD 53 
per household per annum. 
Quah and Chia (2013) studied the losses from increases in particulate matter in the air in 
Singapore. They estimate the health costs associated with a 15 µg/m
3 change in 
concentration at roughly USD 3.75 billion, or about 2 per cent of the gross national 
product in 2009. They use a benefit transfer method, where the economic valuation of 
health effects is estimated based on other research into the willingness to pay for 
reducing risk of premature mortality, and a cost-of-illness approach to value changes in 
morbidity. The authors note that whereas health effects due to air pollution are relatively 
easy to identify, placing an economic value on mortality and morbidity using the benefit 
transfer approach is challenging. Firstly, research on this topic is comparatively scarce, 
and secondly, existing studies were carried out in a developed country context and it is 
thus necessary to assume that people in developed countries have preferences similar to 
those of the inhabitants of Singapore.  
Leiman (2013) documented the economic valuation of a series of cost–benefit analyses 
(CBAs) that were carried out to inform state decision-making on air quality by the South 
Africa National Economic Development and Labour Council. A total of 32 interventions 
were considered in the CBAs taking into account direct financial costs and benefits, 
direct economic costs and benefits, and indirect economic impacts. The distributional 
effects were also considered. The primary concern of the economic valuation was with 
the health costs associated with air pollution, so it was decided to use existing dose-
response functions from other countries and focus on reductions in premature mortality 
and impacts on statistical life and disability-adjusted life-years. This was then valued 
using a benefit transfer methodology to convert estimates from studies in the United 
States into ones applicable to the South African case. The CBA was complemented by 
an analysis of impacts on stakeholders and on employment over time.  
These three examples show how non-economic losses are valued and taken into 
consideration in policy decisions in developing and emerging countries. CBA in these 
countries relies heavily on the benefits transfer methodology which may bias the results; 
however, these analyses have proved to be effective tools in policymaking in all three 
cases.  
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much effort has been expended in creating databases of valuation studies that can be used 
as  an  ‘off-the-shelf’  benefit  transfer,  such  as  the  environmental  valuation  reference 
inventory (EVRI). 
124.  Economic valuation can provide monetary estimates of non-economic losses from 
climate change. Since money is the numéraire, these are in principle fully comparable with 
economic losses and with an enormous variety of other effects of decisions, such as the 
costs of adaptation. Commensurability is thus one of the main attractions of the approach, 
especially given the importance of money values for decision makers. Those who identify 
with the normative foundations of welfare economics (essentially modern utilitarianism) 
will also find it convincing a priori, while opponents of these foundations, for example 
those who would place more emphasis on human rights, will see this as a disadvantage. 
125.  Concerns remain though about the reliability and validity of shadow prices of non-
economic goods/services/assets obtained through these valuation techniques. Moreover, in 
some cases it may simply be practically infeasible to infer shadow prices where no primary 
studies exist that could be credibly used as a basis for the benefit transfer method. In reality, 
then,  the  best  efforts  to  conduct  holistic  CBA  or  capital  accounting  may  continue  to 
disregard  some  non-economic  effects.  One  could  say  that  the  presence  of  some  non-
monetized effects in CBA/capital accounting cannot be avoided, and that one should rather 
ask how significant such effects are relative to those that are included, and if they have the 
capacity to change the advice given. 
126.  In  addition  to  uncertainty  about  shadow  pricing,  other  aspects  of  the  valuation 
process, notably the discounting of future monetary flows, are also subject to significant 
uncertainty  and  results  of  the  analysis  are  often  highly  sensitive  to  these  uncertainties. 
However, it is worth stressing that all valuation methods must deal in some way or another 
with issues such as weighing different effects in different time periods. These concerns are 
thus not unique to economic valuation; they are just more explicit. 
127.  A  simple  technique  that  has  been  suggested  for  understanding  how  large  non-
economic effects  would  have to be in order to change a  decision is that of  ‘switching 
values’. For instance, if CBA tells us that a particular development action has positive net 
present value and should be implemented despite concerns for non-economic losses such as 
damage to environmental/cultural assets that have not been monetized, one option is to ask 
how large the value of such damage would have to be in order to reverse the decision (yield 
negative net present value), and in turn to ask how likely it is that the value of this damage 
could be so high (Spackman, 2013). A good example of this approach is offered by Hahn 
and Passell (2010). 
128.  The use of economic valuation techniques in CBA, where the objective is to assess 
the merits of a particular project, has a corollary in national accounting, where the objective 
is to create aggregate indicators of economic performance and well-being. Green/wealth 
accounting techniques aim to broaden national accounting frameworks by incorporating the 
value  of  non-economic  assets,  such  as  social  capital  and  environmental  capital.  Green 
accounts use the same economic valuation techniques as CBA to enrich macroeconomic 
decision-making and discuss notions such as economic performance and national wealth in 
terms broader than just economic output, savings and investment. 
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3.  Multicriteria decision analysis 
129.  The  principal  quantitative  rival  to  economic  valuation  is  MCDA,  a  technique 
developed  in  management  science  to  aid  coherent  decision-making  in  the  face  of 
complexity. The notion of coherent decision-making comes from normative decision theory 
and is usually taken to be utility maximization, observing a set of simple and generally 
uncontroversial behavioural precepts or axioms. MCDA has been usefully defined as “a 
way of looking at complex problems that are characterized by any mixture of monetary and 
non-monetary objectives, of breaking the problem into more manageable pieces to allow 
Box 5 
Botswana’s wealth/capital accounting system 
An example of wealth/capital accounting can be found in Botswana. Botswana has long 
been a pioneer in natural resource management and is now working with the Wealth 
Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) partnership to ensure 
that national accounts used to measure and plan for economic growth include the value 
of natural resources. WAVES, a broad coalition of United Nations agencies, 
governments, international institutes, nongovernmental organizations and academics, 
has developed a workplan detailing activities for 2012–2016 in collaboration with the 
government of Botswana. 
According to WAVES, Botswana’s natural capital is worth a third of its total wealth, 
consisting of a combination of minerals, energy, protected areas, crops, pasture land and 
non-timber forest products.  
Since 1966 Botswana has prepared ten national development plans. The current 
priorities to generate economic growth reflect the importance of non-economic items. 
They include nature-based tourism, mining and agriculture and aim to diversify the 
economy away from diamond mining and to reduce poverty. To plan appropriately for 
these development goals, information about natural resource endowments must be 
gathered. 
The government has identified four strands of work that will help fill in key information 
gaps on non-economic items and thus improve decision-making. These strands are: 
(a)  Implement revised indicators that account for natural capital, including 
adjusted net national income and adjusted net savings, and build 
comprehensive wealth accounts to assess the prospects for long-term, 
sustainable growth; 
(b)  Build detailed accounts of Botswana’s energy resources and energy use to 
assess the optimal energy mix for the future and examine the role of 
Botswana’s coal in a green economy; 
(c)  Create national and ecosystem-based tourism accounts to inform management 
of eco-tourism in four key ecosystems: Okavango, Chobe, Makgadikgadi Pans 
and Central Kalahari; 
(d)  Compile water accounts in order to manage scarce water supplies and 
contribute to the policy on a national water tariff, scheduled for 2013–2014. 
The four strands are designed to run in parallel to, and feed into, other policy areas and 
programmes. Currently, the institutional arrangements that are needed to implement the 
workplan are being developed. The WAVES programme hopes to strengthen the process 
of development planning by ensuring a true consideration of natural resources and 
ecosystems and so enable better decisions.  
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data and judgements to be brought to bear on the pieces, and then of reassembling the 
pieces to present a coherent overall picture to decision makers” (DTLR, 2001, chapter 6). 
130.  At the heart of MCDA is the selection of a set of criteria against which various 
alternative actions are to be evaluated, the scoring of the performance of each action against 
each criterion using a consistent scoring scheme, and lastly and perhaps most importantly 
the weighting of the various criteria. In this way each alternative action can be given a 
single  weighted  score,  which  can  be  compared  with  the  weighted  scores  of  the  other 
actions. Full commensurability is  thus obtained, as in economic  valuation, between the 
actions being explicitly evaluated, but, unlike economic valuation, not with other actions 
outside the scope of the analysis. 
131.  MCDA  is  used  perhaps  more  sparingly  in  environmental,  social  and  economic 
assessment than CBA and other (e)valuation methods. Again, done properly it is resource- 
intensive,  especially  if  it  is  carried  out  with  a  strong  emphasis  on  deliberation  and 
stakeholder  involvement  in  the  process.  Nonetheless  one  can  find  many  individual 
examples  of  its  application,  including  to  controversial  issues  such  as  radioactive  waste 
management.  In  the  context  of  climate  change  policy,  MCDA  has  found  use  in  the 
preparation of virtually all national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) – see box 6. 
132.  The  differences  between  economic  valuation  and  MCDA  are  in  some  respects 
obvious  (e.g.  the  former  uses  money  as  a  numéraire  while  the  latter  uses  an  arbitrary 
scoring system), while in other respects they are subtle. In particular, the methods mainly 
differ in their approaches to weighting. CBA contains its own form of implicit weighting in 
the shape of market and shadow prices. The price level indicates the strength of preference 
and it is the preferences of people participating in markets as consumers or in revealed and 
stated preference studies as representative subjects that count. By contrast, in MCDA the 
weighting is done by a group of people involved in making the decision in question, e.g. 
policymakers  and  managers.  MCDA  does  not  usually  aim  for  representation  of  the 
population, rather the whole point is to help decision makers structure the problems they 
face and come to coherent decisions, given their goals. Thus much of the emphasis is on the 
deliberative and procedural aspect of the approach, with respect to whoever is participating 
in the MCDA. On the other hand there is clearly the risk that the process lacks legitimacy, 
especially since the results of MCDA can be very sensitive to the weights chosen. 
133.  The  somewhat  less  information-intensive  scoring  and  weighting  system  used  by 
MCDA makes it easier to deal with highly intangible non-economic effects in MCDA than 
in CBA for which primary studies of shadow prices may not exist as discussed above. 
However, this does not necessarily imply that the resulting valuation is more reliable or 
valid. 
4.  Risk indices 
134.  The composite risk indices developed for some vulnerability assessments are worth 
mentioning at this point, e.g. the WorldRiskIndex introduced in box 7, because they share 
many  similarities  with  MCDA.  In  particular,  they  are  also  constructed  by  scoring 
vulnerability on multiple criteria and then weighting the criteria to create a single index 
value.  Hence  such  risk  indices  are  subject  to  most  of  the  same  advantages  and 
disadvantages identified in relation to MCDA. 
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Box 6 
Multicriteria decision analysis to design a national adaptation programme of action 
Multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) has been applied by least developed countries, 
including Zambia and Bangladesh, to devise their national adaptation programmes of 
action – NAPAs (Ministry of Environment and Forest Bangladesh, 2005; Ministry of 
Tourism Environment and Natural Resources Zambia, 2007). MCDA serves mainly as a 
tool for the teams developing NAPAs to rank the identified necessary adaptation actions 
by priority, thereby allowing decision makers to select projects that yield the highest  
benefits to society (economic and non-economic). 
Zambia’s dependency on natural resources makes the country highly vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change. Sensitive sectors are agriculture and food security, wildlife, 
forestry, water and energy, and human health. Zambia developed its NAPA by 
evaluating the impacts of climate change on these sectors. It used MCDA to rank 39 
identified adaptation actions in order of urgency, highlighting ten immediate priority 
adaptation interventions. The NAPA team applied the following rating and ranking 
approach: the three focus areas of sustainable development (economic, environmental 
and social) were rated as equally important. A total of 14 indicators for the three areas 
were selected, including contribution to economic growth, impact on Millennium 
Development Goals and impact on health, with each project scored 1–9, from weakly to 
extremely important, in contributing to the indicators. The top three priority projects 
identified were: strengthening of early warning systems across the country, promotion of 
alternative sources of livelihoods, and adaptation to the effects of drought.  
Bangladesh is particularly vulnerable to climate change-related disasters, including 
cyclones and flooding. Bangladesh applies MCDA in selecting a list of priority activities 
in its NAPA. The NAPA notes that there is a lack of concrete, quantifiable data in some 
places and areas, which implies that MCDA is more appropriate than cost–benefit or 
cost-effectiveness analysis. It cites community-led decision-making, stakeholder 
preference, expert judgment, national goals and strategies as key inputs in MCDA. More 
than 40 projects were identified, of which 15 were selected as priority actions through a 
national stakeholder consultation.  
The criteria used were: 
(a)  Impacts of climate change on the lives and livelihoods of the communities; 
(b)  Poverty reduction and sustainable income generation of communities; 
(c)  Enhancement of adaptive capacity in terms of capabilities at community and 
national level; 
(d)  Gender equality (as a cross-cutting criteria); 
(e)  Enhancement of environmental sustainability; 
(f)  Complementary and synergy with national and sectoral plans and programmes; 
(g)  Cost effectiveness. 
Among the priority projects selected are the reduction of climate change hazards 
through coastal afforestation with community participation and providing drinking water 
to coastal communities to combat enhanced salinity due to sea level rise.  
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135.  Of course the nature of the task is different, in that MCDA is usually used to give 
structure to a particular decision between alternative courses of action (e.g. configuration of 
a NAPA), while risk indices are constructed to compare vulnerability in different places, 
with a more indirect connection between the analysis and the actions. Consequently risk 
indices tend to be created by expert organizations without necessarily having the strong 
procedural emphasis on a ‘best practice’ deliberative MCDA. Not all MCDAs, on the other 
hand, are deliberative in this way. 
5.  Qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches 
136.  It is tempting to think that appraisal and assessment must always include some sort 
of formal, quantitative (e)valuation, such as CBA or MCDA, but in fact the majority of it, 
embodied in routine EIA, SEA etc., does not. Rather, information on the multiple effects of 
development, existing economic activity or natural environmental phenomena is brought 
together in a more disaggregated form, and it is left to the decision makers in support of 
whom the analysis has been conducted to form their own views on the trade-offs suggested 
and  their  implications  for  the  decision.  There  are  many  reasons  for  this,  including 
Box 7 
The WorldRiskIndex 
The WorldRiskIndex, which has been developed by the United Nations University 
Institute for Environment and Human Security in cooperation with the Alliance 
Development Works, is an attempt to score on a single index the risk of becoming a 
victim of disasters resulting from extreme natural events. The index could be applied at 
multiple scales from the national to the local as a means of identifying risk hotspots and 
informing risk reduction strategies. The annual WorldRiskReport ranks 173 countries in 
its index. 
The concept underpinning the index is that the risk of becoming a victim of disasters 
resulting from extreme natural events depends on exposure to extreme natural events on 
the one hand, and vulnerability on the other hand. Vulnerability in turn depends on 
susceptibility, short-term coping capacities and long-term adaptive capacities, so that the 
WorldRiskIndex has four components overall: 
1.  Exposure to natural hazards; 
2.  Susceptibility; 
3.  Coping capacities; 
4.  Adaptive capacities. 
Within this framework, the index is constructed in hierarchical fashion. First, for each of 
the four categories above, a set of multiple indicators is chosen. These are standardised 
on a scale from 0 to 1 and then combined using a weighting scheme. Then the composite 
indices of 1–4 are themselves combined using another weighting scheme and rescaled 
into a percentage. The similarities between constructing such an index and carrying out 
MCDA are obvious. According to the methodology described for the construction of the 
WorldRiskIndex, the weighting scheme was chosen using a mix of expert opinion from 
a survey of mainly development cooperation specialists and statistical (factor) analysis.  
According to the 2012 version of the index, global hotspots for disaster risk can be 
found in Oceania, Southeast Asia, the southern Sahel and Central America. These are 
areas where exposure to natural hazards and climate change is combined with high 
vulnerability owing mainly to a low level of socioeconomic development. Moreover, 8 
of the 15 highest risk countries are island states, which, owing to their proximity to the 
sea, are particularly exposed to cyclones, flooding and sea level rise.  
46 
 
institutional cultures and preferences, but one major factor is that doing so is less resource-
intensive, as costly CBA/MCDA is avoided. 
137.  According to this approach, formal evaluation usually stops at the presentation of an 
impact  matrix/summary  table.  An  example  is  given  in  box  8,  which  is  actually  from 
CCIAV, in which various climate risks are scored on a simple, qualitative scale and brought 
together but are neither weighted nor combined. Who does the scoring is clearly important; 
typically the assessment is carried out according to the expert subjective judgement of the 
team.  It  is  not  always  the  case  that  the  various  effects  are  transposed  onto  a  common 
scoring scale, as in the example shown in box 8. Sometimes each effect is expressed in a 
different numéraire, usually  according to the natural  way of  measuring it (e.g. costs in 
financial  terms,  employment  effects  in  number  of  jobs  created/lost,  pollution  effects  in 
physical units, amenity/cultural effects on a qualitative scale or even simply by textual 
description). 
138.  Good  examples  of  such  matrices/tables  have  the  advantage  that  the  trade-offs 
inherent to the choices facing decision makers are transparent. In CBA, for instance, this 
may not be the case as the various positive and negative effects can be subsumed in the 
overall net present value of the options analysed. 
139.  A key feature of this approach is that it places the responsibility for making the 
trade-offs on the decision maker rather than the analyst. Views differ on whether this is 
advantageous,  with  some  pointing  to  the  benefits  of  decision  makers  having  greater 
‘ownership’ over the key trade-offs, and others pointing to the possible inconsistencies and 
biases introduced when decision makers do not have the help of formal analytical tools. 
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Box 8 
The United Kingdom’s climate change risk assessment 
There are many examples of the use of qualitative and semi-quantitative methods of 
impact (e)valuation in environmental impact assessment, strategic environmental 
assessment, climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability assessment (CCIAV) 
and elsewhere. A recent example from the sphere of CCIAV is the climate change risk 
assessment (CCRA) performed in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, which was tasked with collecting, comparing and summarizing, for the national 
government, the latest evidence on the risks and opportunities presented by climate 
change for the United Kingdom up to 2100. 
Many aspects of this CCRA will be of interest to those developing methods to assess 
non-economic losses from climate change elsewhere, for instance the use of scenarios 
and model-based climate predictions. At the same time, there have been criticisms of 
this CCRA that are also instructive, for example its failure to adequately incorporate 
risks to the United Kingdom from climate impacts occurring beyond the United 
Kingdom. Here the paper will focus, however, on how the various risks from climate 
change to the United Kingdom are valued and compared in evaluation. 
This CCRA involved an assessment of hundreds of different kinds of climate risk in 
different sectors. Some potential risks were quantified and costed in economic terms, 
others, such as areas of land affected or numbers of people harmed, were quantified in 
natural units but not monetized, while still other estimates were based on expert 
elicitation or simply qualitative reviews of the evidence. 
In order to compare risks, this CCRA used a common qualitative/semi-quantitative 
scale, rating each risk “low”, “medium” or “high”. This rating was based in part and 
where possible on quantitative thresholds such as pounds of damage or lives affected, 
but expert judgement was required in most places, including where to set such 
thresholds. Because of significant uncertainty about the magnitude of climate risks, it is 
worth noting that what is classified as high risk depends further on the number of 
scenarios or confidence interval over which the magnitude of risk is judged to be high. 
In addition to assessing the magnitude of the risks, the CCRA incorporated a similar 
qualitative/semi-quantitative assessment of the degree of confidence in the risk estimates 
(from “low” to “very high”) and assessment of the perceived urgency of adaptation 
measures to manage them as a function of the speed of onset of high consequences and a 
preliminary assessment of adaptive capacity. 
Figure 11 illustrates how some of this information and analysis is brought together in a 
combined assessment of the highest magnitude risks (positive and negative) and their 
associated confidence levels.  
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Figure 11 
Example risk matrix from the United Kingdom’s climate change risk assessment 
Source: HR Wallingford (2012).  
49 
 
6.  Synthesis 
140.  The  following  table  is  a  synthesis  of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the 
approaches discussed here, where, given the similarities, MCDA and composite risk indices 
are combined. 
Table 5 
Comparison of methods for valuating non-economic losses 
 
Method  Advantages  Disadvantages 
Economic valuation  Structured, systematic approach to 
evaluation of non-economic and 
economic effects 
Facilitating economically efficient 
adaptation via full 
commensurability of non-
economic effects of measures 
with economic effects and with 
effects of policy in other domains 
Salience of economic values with 
decision makers may promote 
political prioritisation of 
adaptation 
Unreliability of and uncertainty about 
monetary values and other aspects of 
economic appraisal such as discounting 
Economic efficiency may not be judged 
to be the appropriate decision criterion 
Resource-intensive 
Emphasis on expert input and summary 
values can leave decision makers 
disconnected from the process 
Multicriteria decision 
analysis /composite risk 
indices 
Structured, systematic approach to 
evaluation of non-economic and 
economic elements 
Full commensurability possible 
between options evaluated 
Puts decision makers at the heart 
of the evaluation process 
Relatively easy to incorporate 
non-economic effects 
Generally resource-intensive if method 
is employed to the full 
Generally lacking robustness in scoring 
and weighting choices, a problem more 
acute for non-economic elements where 
there is less evidence to inform scores 
and weights assigned 
Lacking transparency for those not 
involved 
Depending on who is involved in the 
evaluation process it can lack legitimacy 
Qualitative and semi-
quantitative approaches 
Avoiding uncertainties inherent in 
explicit aggregation across effects 
Generally more transparent than 
methods involving 
scoring/weighting/pricing 
Relatively easy to incorporate 
non-economic effects 
Less resource-intensive 
Putting onus on decision makers to 
implicitly perform comparisons, 
aggregation and make judgements based 
on reading of analysis. This opens up 
more risk of inconsistency and bias 
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VI.  Managing the risks of non-economic losses 
Incorporating non-economic value into economic decision-making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141.  The assessment methods and valuation techniques introduced in chapter V above 
contain a blueprint for how public and private decision makers can take into account the 
non-economic impacts of their actions. Many countries have adopted these techniques, both 
in the developed and the developing world. Yet significant institutional challenges remain. 
Accounting fully for non-economic factors in decision-making is still the exception rather 
than the rule. 
142.  Incorporating  non-economic  values  into  economic  decision-making,  for  example 
through environmental impact assessments or cost–benefit analysis, would go a long way 
towards ensuring that non-economic systems are robust and healthy. There is evidence that 
well-maintained ecosystems are better able to deal with climate change-related stress than 
those subject to anthropogenic pressure (ASC, 2010). In some instances adaptation itself 
can add to pressure on ecosystems, for example if shoreline protection results in reduced 
coastal habitat. Again, the incorporation of non-economic impacts into decision-making 
would help to identify and manage the trade-offs. There are many more examples of how 
acknowledging non-economic values leads to better decisions that enhance the welfare of 
the societies concerned (e.g. TEEB, 2010a, 2010b). 
143.  A broader observation is that the future vulnerability of economic and non-economic 
systems is determined by large-scale trends and development decisions, such as patterns of 
Box 9 
Chapter summary 
-  Incorporating non-economic values into economic decision-making would greatly 
increase the likelihood that non-economic systems remain robust and healthy. 
-  However, using the techniques of chapter V as a matter of course requires 
institutional adjustments and a change in appraisal mentality. Monitoring, assessing 
and managing non-economic impact is not standard practice yet in the way that 
financial and economic appraisal are. 
 
-  Making good adaptation decisions may reduce the risk of economic and non-
economic losses alike, as the two are often linked. For example, flood protection will 
help to avoid losses related to production interruptions, an economic loss, as well as 
distress and the outbreak of disease, which are non-economic losses. 
 
-  A key adaptation challenge is to set the right priorities for the immediate future, with 
a focus on win-win measures that yield immediate benefits (e.g. flood protection, 
environmental protection) and measures that affect the long-term vulnerability 
profile of countries (e.g. planning and infrastructure decisions).  
 
-  It is important to recognize the practical limits to adaptation. A second adaptation 
challenge is therefore to remove barriers to effective adaptation by both public and 
private decision makers. Problems may be institutional, policy-related, market-
related, cognitive or related to insufficient funding, information and skills. The way 
non-economic impacts are treated – measured, valued and assessed – in adaptation 
decision-making is one such barrier and can affect the level of non-economic loss.  
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migration, decisions where to build, how to develop and what to produce, as much as by 
micro-level adaptation choices (Bowen,  Cochrane and Fankhauser, 2011). Decisions on 
economic  diversification,  for  example  away  from  agriculture  or  into  different  forms  of 
agriculture,  may affect the impact of future droughts and their social and humanitarian 
costs.  Decisions  on  the  development  of  coastlines  can  similarly  affect  vulnerability  to 
future sea level rise. These decisions would be better informed if they were based on an 
understanding of economic prosperity broader than just economic output, e.g. a set of green 
national accounts. 
144.  A first step in managing non-economic losses from climate change is therefore to 
systematically adopt and employ non-economic evaluation and appraisal techniques. Non-
economic value has to be recognized not just in environment ministries but also in finance, 
economics and planning ministries, where key economic decisions are often taken. 
145.  Doing so raises practical issues of institutional capacity and political culture. Setting 
up  sound  environmental  and  social  appraisal  procedures  requires  administrative  depth, 
technical skill and the ability to enforce the rules. This is often lacking both at the national 
and subnational level. Governments need to create a legal basis that incorporates the need 
for  non-economic  assessments  into  the  framework  of  government  decision-making. 
Technical  assistance  may  be  required  to  roll  out  the  methods  across  government 
departments and ensure their uniform application.  
146.  Assigning a truthful value to non-economic effects is analytically very complex. It 
requires a good understanding not just of valuation, but also of how non-economic systems 
function and how they react to stress. However, as chapter V above has shown, not all 
evaluation techniques are equally demanding, and there are ways of adjusting appraisal 
techniques to different institutional contexts. International standards, such as the UN-led 
System  of  Environmental  and  Economic  Accounting,  contain  pragmatic  guidelines  that 
acknowledge analytical difficulties and allow countries to get started and learn by doing. In 
fact, some developing countries are at the forefront of environmental decision-making (see 
box 6 above).  
Making good adaptation decisions in addressing non-economic losses 
147.  Making  good  adaptation  decisions  will  reduce  the  risk  of  economic  and  non-
economic losses alike, as the two are often linked. For example, flood protection will help 
to avoid loss related to production interruptions (economic loss), as well as distress and the 
outbreak of disease (non-economic loss).  
148.  A small body of literature has emerged on how to make good adaptation decisions 
and spend adaptation money wisely (e.g. Fankhauser and Burton (2011)). These studies 
emphasize the need for good project appraisal to avoid maladaptation, as outlined above. 
Another key theme is the need to set the right adaptation priorities for the immediate future.  
149.  While it is important not to delay action, not all adaptation has to be initiated at 
once. Adaptation is a long-term problem that will occupy policymakers for many decades 
to come. Even in high vulnerability areas some actions are more urgent than others. In 
general, there are three main situations where it is advisable to bring adaptation forward 
(Fankhauser et al., 1999, 2013; ASC, 2010). All three of them are of direct relevance to the 
avoidance of non-economic losses: 
(a)  Adaptations  with  early,  robust  benefits.  Starting  early  is  important  if  the 
proposed measures have immediate benefits that would otherwise be forgone. Disaster risk 
management  falls  into  this  category  (UNISDR,  2013),  as  do  adaptations  with  strong 
development co-benefits, such as better health and sanitation systems. Another intervention  
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that can yield non-economic co-benefits early on is the protection of environmental assets. 
For instance, preserving coastal wetlands yields many economic and non-economic benefits 
in terms of ecosystem services, including protection against coastal flooding. A study of the 
Muthurajawela Marsh in Sri Lanka found that flood attenuation accounted for two thirds of 
the benefits that the wetland provides (Emerton and Kekulandala, 2003); 
(b)  ‘Low-regrets’ adaptations with long lead times. It makes sense to fast-track 
adaptation measures that are known to be crucial for the future, if they take time to ramp 
up. The development of new skills (e.g. in assessment and valuation techniques like CBA 
and  MCDA)  arguably  falls  into  this  category.  Building  adaptive  capacity  through 
knowledge  systems,  risk  governance,  institutional  strengthening  and  training  is  another 
activity that can take time and should therefore start early; 
(c)  Areas where decisions today could ‘lock in’ vulnerability profiles for a long 
time. Fast-tracking adaptation is desirable if a wrong decision today makes countries more 
vulnerable in the future and if those effects (e.g. in the case of environmental degradation) 
are costly to reverse. Many big development decisions fall into this category, including 
those  on  land  use  planning  (e.g.  the  development  of  coastal  zones)  and  long-term 
infrastructure (e.g. the design of new water and sanitation systems). Analysing lock-in is 
more complicated than the other two categories and requires more complex assessment 
techniques that deal adequately with climate uncertainty (e.g. Ranger et al. (2010)). 
Addressing practical limits to adaptation in non-economic sectors 
150.  It is important to remember the practical limits to adaptation when considering loss 
and damage for if it were possible to adapt to the full range of adverse effects of climate 
change  then  there  would  be  no  loss  and  damage.  However,  there  are  constraints  on 
achieving  such  adaptation  and  identifying  these  constraints  indicates  when  a  loss  and 
damage assessment may be necessary. 
151.  In the context of non-economic losses the most important constraints to adaptation 
are likely to include (see Fankhauser and Soare (2012)): 
(a)  Institutional  and  financial  constraints:  perhaps  the  main  institutional 
constraint to adaptation, particularly in developing countries, is a lack of adaptive capacity 
–  including  sufficient  financial  and  technical  resources.  Even  in  developed  countries, 
adaptation performance can be hampered by governance, policy and regulatory problems. 
A prominent example is the  water sector,  where poor regulation, under-investment and 
pricing subsidies often prevent effective adaptation. In other areas, such as environmental 
protection, adaptation may be held back by governance failures, corruption or strong vested 
interests. Institutional competition, layered bureaucracy and entrenched rules and traditions 
can hamper the ability of organizations to respond to changing circumstances; 
(b)  Market failures: market imperfections – some generic, others particular to 
adaptation – that may affect the effectiveness of adaptation include externalities, or more 
generally a lack of coordination, between adaptation agents (e.g. up-river and down-river 
communities), asymmetric information (e.g. about the risk profile of properties) or moral 
hazard (e.g. for people with insurance coverage or with at-risk communities holding out for 
government assistance). Path dependence may affect the choice between protection and 
relocation, for example, for highly vulnerable historic locations; 
(c)  Behavioural and information barriers: adaptation may suffer from a lack of 
awareness, information and skills which means that climate risks are under-managed. More 
profoundly,  complex,  long-term  adaptation  decisions  may  be  affected  by  well-known 
cognitive barriers that lead to inertia, procrastination and, indirectly, high discount rates.  
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152.  A  priority  role  of  national  governments  and  the  international  community  is  to 
overcome these barriers where possible and provide an environment that is conducive to 
effective adaptation by individual decision makers: individuals, households, firms and local 
communities. 
153.  It should be recognized that there are ultimately also technological, biophysical or 
economic constraints to adaptation. If climate risks were severe, there may be cases where 
the protection of some natural or societal assets is no longer a realistic option. Prominent 
examples  in  the  natural  world  include  glaciers  and  coral  reefs,  which  provide  many 
ecosystem services but face clear limits to adaptation. Similarly, a small island nation may 
become inundated due to sea level rise and its population relocated. Even though the nation 
would persist, without its original geographical location the people of the nation would 
suffer a loss in terms of displacement, culture, belonging, history and sovereignty. 
154.  This reinforces the urgency for the most crucial and urgent measure for reducing 
climate  risks  and  enable  economic  development  in  a  sustainable  manner:  combining 
adaptation  with  the  reduction  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions  to  a  level  that  prevents 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
VII.  Conclusions 
155.  This technical paper responds to a request by the Parties at COP 18 to carry out 
further activities under the work programme on loss and damage, including the preparation 
of a technical paper on non-economic losses (decision 3/CP.18, para. 10(b)). 
156.  This technical paper defines non-economic losses as losses that are not commonly 
traded in markets (either formal or informal) and are therefore not captured by the system 
of national accounts. This technical paper distinguishes among three main categories of 
non-economic losses: loss to private individuals (e.g. loss of life, health impacts, human 
mobility), loss to society (e.g. loss of territory, cultural heritage, indigenous knowledge) 
and  environmental  loss  (e.g.  biodiversity  and  ecosystem  services).  Losses  may  occur 
through many channels. They may be related to both slow onset impacts (e.g. the loss of 
territory to sea level rise) and extreme events (e.g. loss of life in a cyclone). The loss may 
be  directly  linked  to  climate  change  (e.g.  loss  of  ecosystems)  or  occur  indirectly  (e.g. 
malnutrition as a consequence of impacts in the agriculture sector). 
157.  The  absence  of  a  market  price  makes  the  assessment  of  non-economic  losses 
challenging, but their effect on human welfare is no less important. Non-economic loss is 
an  important  aspect  of  the  total  cost  of  climate  change,  alongside  mitigation  cost, 
adaptation  costs  and  economic  loss  and  damage.  In  many  developing  countries,  non-
economic losses may well be more significant than economic losses. 
158.  Recommendation: Recognizing, assessing and managing the risk of non-economic 
loss should be a central aspect of climate change policy. 
159.  This technical paper outlines the main techniques available to assess non-economic 
losses. Many of them are well known. This is not the first time that policymakers have 
confronted the question of how to take into account the non-economic effects of policy or 
investment  decisions.  There  is  experience  in  many  countries  in  the  assessment  of 
environmental and social  impacts of new  economic development, of existing economic 
activity and of natural environmental phenomena (e.g. environmental impact assessment, 
cost–benefit  analysis,  disaster  loss  assessment  and  many  more).  This  technical  paper 
identifies  four  broad  categories  of  valuation  technique:  economic  valuation,  MCDA, 
composite  risk  indices  and  qualitative/semi-quantitative  methods.  That  is,  valuation  is 
interpreted  not  solely  as  assigning  monetary  values  but  more  broadly  as  the  act  of  
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‘comparing  the  relative  merits  of  actions  or  objects’.  The  different  assessment  and 
evaluation methods all have their advantages and disadvantages. 
160.  Recommendation:  Policymakers  should  make  use  of  the  full  range  of  available 
assessment  and  evaluation  techniques.  The  suitability  of  each  depends  on  institutional 
contexts as well as the problem at hand. 
161.  Whatever method is chosen, the assessment and valuation of non-economic impacts 
remains very difficult owing to the many uncertainties involved and to the essential role of 
value  judgements.  These  difficulties  are  usually  magnified  where  analytical  capacity  is 
limited. Because of this complexity, it is very difficult to express aggregate damage in a 
single number representing the ‘total non-economic loss’. 
162.  Recommendation: A detailed quantification of non-economic loss should rely on a 
number of different metrics, not just a single number representing the ‘total non-economic 
loss’. 
163.  This  technical  paper  then  outlines  out  the  main  implications  for  the  design  of 
practical adaptation actions. Two main challenges are highlighted. The first challenge is the 
identification  and  quantification  of  non-economic  value  and  its  inclusion  in  decision-
making  using  the  techniques  introduced  in  this  technical  paper.  Incorporating  non-
economic values into economic decision-making is an important first step towards ensuring 
that non-economic systems are properly managed and are robust and healthy. However, 
using  non-economic  evaluation  techniques  as  a  matter  of  course  requires  institutional 
adjustments and a change in appraisal mentality. 
164.  Recommendation: Policymakers should make the use of non-economic evaluation 
techniques a requirement in project appraisal. The Convention  may aid this process by 
providing  hands-on  guidance  that  would  ensure  non-economic  impacts  are  treated  – 
measured, valued and assessed – appropriately in public decision making. 
165.  The second challenge is adaptation to climate change more broadly. Many of the 
issues  faced  by  the  adaptation  community  are  the  same  whether  the  aim  is  to  prevent 
economic or non-economic loss. Making good adaptation decisions will reduce the risk of 
economic and non-economic losses alike, as the two are often linked. In practice, however, 
there are many potential barriers to effective adaptation. Overcoming them is one of the 
main challenges of good adaptation in addition to the need to set appropriate priorities. 
166.  Recommendation: Policymakers and the international community should make the 
removal of adaptation barriers an immediate priority for adaptation assistance in developing 
countries,  whether  the  barriers  are  institutional,  funding-related,  policy-related,  market-
related, cognitive or due to insufficient information and skills. 
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Annex 
Frameworks for assessing non-economic losses 
B.  Environmental impact assessment 
1.  Environmental  impact  assessment  (EIA)  is  generally  defined  as  the  systematic 
assessment of environmental impacts of any development action in advance of it being 
taken. EIA was first legislated in the United States of America in 1969 as a requirement to 
accompany proposals for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment”
1 and has subsequently been rolled out in well over 100 countries, 
including many developing countries, as well as international organizations. Thus there is a 
great deal of experience with EIA and that is one reason why it is valuable to think about its 
relevance to the issues related to assessing non-economic losses. 
2.  EIA has several key features relevant to our discussion: 
(a)  It is predictive, in that it is intended to inform policymakers on the impacts of 
development ex ante; 
(b)  It requires the assessment of the effects of development to be done in an 
integrated, holistic and multi-disciplinary way, in principle bringing together and giving 
parity  of  esteem  to  economic,  social  and  environmental  effects,  both  quantitative  and 
qualitative; 
(c)  Nevertheless, its origins are in environmental legislation and it has often been 
regarded as strongest on environmental effects, alongside economic effects that are often 
easy  to  quantify  and  prominent  in  the  context  of  development  (e.g.  jobs  created)  and 
weakest on social effects; 
(d)  In  some  countries  there  are  separate  arrangements  for  socioeconomic  or 
social impact assessment, which focus on social and/or economic effects of development, 
whereas in others they are in principle integrated with EIA. There are, in some places, even 
more specific applications or proposed applications, such as the health impact assessment 
and the environmental justice impact assessment; 
(e)  Not  owing  to  the  original  United  States  legislation  or  any  general 
definition/understanding  of  the  concept  of  EIA,  EIA  has  come  to  be  applied  almost 
exclusively  to  geographically  specific  developments  and  projects  such  as  major 
infrastructure works (as opposed to, for example, national policies). Therefore, the methods 
of impact prediction and valuation that have been developed are appropriate to this high 
degree of spatial resolution. In particular, it is common to see some form of quantitative 
impact prediction of environmental effects such as air and water pollution; 
(f)  On  the  other  hand,  in  part  because  of  its  broad  scope  in  terms  of 
environmental, social and economic effects and, moreover, because of the need to apply it 
routinely in a local context, at the (e)valuation stage EIA is normally less quantitative and 
technical than some other assessment frameworks, such as CBA. 
3.  Figure 12 offers a schematic representation of the EIA process and singles out the 
steps of most relevance to this technical paper (circled by the dashed line). The prediction 
of impacts “aims to identify the magnitude and other dimensions of identified change in the 
environment  with  a  project/action,  by  comparison  with  a  situation  without  that 
project/action” (Glasson, Therivel and Chadwick, 2005, page 5), while the evaluation and 
                                                            
 
1  US National Environmental Policy Act 102.2.C.  
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assessment of significance “assesses the relative significance of the predicted impacts to 
allow a focus on the main adverse impacts” (Glasson, Therivel and Chadwick, op. cit.). 
Note that “mitigating measures” in figure 12 should be understood to mean adaptation to 
climate change in the context of this technical paper. 
Figure 12 
The environmental impact assessment process 
 
Note: The most relevant step of environmental impact assessment for this technical paper is highlighted by the dashed 
line. 
Source: Glasson et al. (2005).  
C.  Strategic environmental assessment 
4.  Strategic  environmental  assessment  (SEA)  has  many  similarities  with  EIA.  The 
steps of the process are broadly the same as in figure 12, for example. The main difference 
is that it has been designed to remedy the failure of most countries to apply EIA to higher-
level development decisions made by governments in the form of new or amended policies, 
plans and programmes. Thus it has been defined as “a systematic process for evaluating the 
environmental consequences of proposed policy, plan or programme initiatives in order to 
ensure they are fully included and appropriately addressed at the earliest appropriate stage 
Project screening (is an EIA needed?)
Scoping (which impacts and issues should be considered?)
Description of the project/development action and alternatives
Description of the environmental baseline
Identification of key impacts
Prediction of impacts
Evaluation and assessment of significance of impacts
Identification of mitigating measures
Presentation of findings in the EIA (including a non-technical 
summary)
Review of the EIA
Decision-making
Post-decision monitoring
Audit of predictions and mitigation measures
Public consultation 
and participation 
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of decision-making on par with economic and social considerations” (Sadler and Verheem, 
1996).  SEA  is  newer  and  less  widespread  than  EIA,
2  but,  nonetheless,  several  dozen 
countries have now legislated for it. 
5.  SEA has several key features relevant to our discussion, as distinct from those of 
EIA: 
(a)  With a focus on strategic actions that are usually larger in scope than the 
focused projects covered by EIA (e.g. greater geographical reach), SEA must concern itself 
much more with the indirect, cumulative and synergistic effects of development, including 
interactions  between  strategic  actions  in  different  domains.  Given  the  greater  scope  of 
strategic  actions,  impact  prediction  techniques  in  SEA  tend  to  be  more  informal  and 
qualitative  than  in  EIA,  where  they  are  based  on  expert  judgement.  As  with  EIA, 
(e)valuation tends to be informal and qualitative; 
(b)  The nature of policymaking in particular means that SEA is applied earlier in 
the  decision-making  process  than  EIA,  which  is  typically  triggered  by  a  specific 
development proposal. Consequently effective SEA needs to be optimally integrated into 
the  existing  policymaking  process,  although  that  can  mean  different  things  in  different 
places; 
(c)  There  can  in  some  cases  be  separate  arrangements  for  the  assessment  of 
economic and social impacts of strategic actions. 
D.  Environmental risk assessment 
6.  While  uncertainty  is  a  pervasive  feature  of  EIA,  SEA  and  other  assessment 
frameworks,  environmental  risk  assessment  (ERA),  often  simply  referred  to  as  risk 
assessment, has developed as a distinct and relatively narrow field. Its origins are in the 
assessment of occupational and consumer risk from chemicals and in nuclear and major 
hazard assessments, both of which have been carried out for many decades. The focus on 
human health and hazardous products and activities is evident in a well-known definition of 
ERA by the United States National Research Council (1983) as “the characterization of the 
potential adverse health effects of human exposures to environmental hazards”. Nowadays 
many  countries  are  applying  ERA  legislation  and  guidelines  to  very  specific  sets  of 
hazards. 
7.  There are many similarities between the steps of the ERA process and the steps of 
the EIA/SEA processes detailed above. Figure 13 sets this out in a diagram. Nonetheless, 
ERA,  which  draws  on  expert,  technical  input,  focuses  more  strongly  on  quantitative 
estimation of the likelihood of a hazard and its consequence. Therefore, the key features of 
ERA for our discussion are: 
(a)  The focus on uncertainty, as opposed to best estimates (which has certainly 
been a feature of EIA), and the formal quantification of that uncertainty; 
(b)  On the other hand, it has  more recently come to be  understood that it is 
desirable to nest formal risk assessment within a broader risk management process that 
admits other considerations,  such as social attitudes towards risks,  which  may be quite 
different from the technical valuation of those risks;  
(c)  A number of scholars have remarked on the potential for cross-fertilization 
between EIA and ERA based on the fact that, by and large, one is strong in areas where the 
other is weak. 
                                                            
 
2  The European Union, for example, first passed an SEA directive in 2004. It passed its original EIA 
directive in 1985.  
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Figure 13 
Stages of risk assessment compared with environmental impact assessment/ strategic 
environmental assessment (‘environmental assessment’) 
 
Source: Adapted from Eduljee (1999). 
E.  Cost–benefit analysis and economic valuation 
8.  CBA  is  the  principal  tool  of  economic  appraisal  of  the  effects  of  development 
actions, usually of a contained nature although CBA-style analysis has also been used to 
study systemic change. As its name suggests, it is a comparison of the social costs and 
benefits of a development action, in money units, where costs/benefits comprise all the 
negative/positive  effects  of  the  action  on  social  welfare.  If  the  social  benefits  of  a 
development action exceed the costs, discounted appropriately to reflect their distribution 
over time and the preference for benefits earlier in time, then the action has positive net 
present value and it is assumed to increase social welfare as conceived by economists. 
Therefore, from an economic perspective, it should go ahead. 
9.  The key features of CBA for our discussion are: 
(a)  In order to be comparable, all costs and benefits must be monetized in CBA. 
Since market prices are usually only available for a subset of such effects, e.g. changes in 
the production of goods such as agricultural crops and timber, a significant amount of non-
market valuation is required in order to ensure that the CBA is comprehensive. Hence non-
market valuation is central to capturing the non-economic effects of development actions in 
CBA; 
(b)  CBA is both an assessment framework in its own right and a method/tool that 
can be used with other frameworks. In a small number of countries, there is a legislative 
requirement to undertake CBA of certain categories of government decisions such as new 
policies  at  the  federal/national  level  (e.g.  in  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Northern  Ireland  and  the  United  States).  Therefore,  such  legislation  dictates  both  that  
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assessment is required and which tool should be used. But, on the other hand, there is in 
principle no reason why CBA could not be used as an impact estimation and valuation tool 
within other assessment frameworks, such as EIA and SEA. That this is not the case in 
practice  is  due  to  many  reasons,  prominent  among  which  are  an  institutional 
culture/preference  for  non-economic  methods  and  the  very  significant  cost  in  terms  of 
resources, time and expertise required to do CBA well; 
(c)  Despite the resource-intensive and expertise-intensive nature of CBA, and 
while it is by no means as prevalent in developing countries as it is in developed countries, 
“the use of cost–benefit analysis as an aid to environmental decision-making has expanded 
in recent years in countries throughout Latin America, Asia, and Africa” (Livermore and 
Revesz, 2013). 
F.  Wealth/capital accounting 
10.  There is an increasing  focus in  many countries on expanded notions of national 
wealth and national accounts, which does not just include narrow measures of economic 
output, savings and wealth, but also non-economic savings and sources of wealth, such as 
natural  assets.  The  World  Bank  has  been  a  prominent  advocate  of  the  approach  and 
measures comprehensive wealth and adjusted net savings for many countries, while the UN 
System of Environmental-Economic  Accounting (SEEA)  contains internationally agreed 
standards for keeping accounts of natural resources, including, but not limited to, monetary 
accounting of natural resources. 
G.  Vulnerability assessment 
11.  The past decade has seen a growing interest in vulnerability assessment from several 
quarters, including organizations involved in disaster risk reduction (such as multilateral 
development agencies like the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
and national aid agencies), and in analysing the impacts of global environmental change 
(including  of  course  climate  change).  Vulnerability  is  the  sort  of  broad  term  that  is 
susceptible to many different theories and interpretations. For example, in his 2006 review, 
Birkmann counts 25 different concepts, definitions and methods and 20 different manuals 
and guidebooks for its estimation. There is every chance these counts have subsequently 
risen.  The  issue  has  also  been  discussed  at  length  by  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on 
Climate  Change  (Contribution  of  Working  Group  II  to  the  Fourth  Assessment  Report, 
chapter 19, Parry et al., 2007). Nonetheless, vulnerability is commonly understood to be a 
function of the following (see Füssel, 2007, and Füssel and Klein, 2006): 
(a)  Exposure; 
(b)  Sensitivity; 
(c)  Adaptive capacity. 
12.  This conceptual framework unites various intellectual traditions because it brings 
together considerations of the features of the natural hazard, on the one hand, and the social 
and economic determinants of the vulnerability of affected people and societies, on the 
other. Within (c) a distinction is sometimes further drawn between short-term coping and 
long-term adaptation. 
13.  Assessing  vulnerability  would  seem  to  necessarily  involve  some  form  of 
measurement,  and,  in  turn,  measurement  involves  the  use  of  one  or  more  
indicators/criteria.  But  because  there  are  many  different  theories  of  vulnerability,  and 
because going from theory to measurement brings added difficulties with it, many measures  
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and systems of measures have been propose involving different choices on dimensions such 
as the degree of quantification, complexity, whether to focus on single or multiple hazards, 
spatial scale, prominence given to local people and local knowledge, etc. Moreover, many 
of these measures have developed within separate traditions, with limited cross-fertilization 
(Romieu et al., 2010). Some are close to ERA, with the hazard in question being natural 
rather than industrial, while others are at the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of 
technical input. 
14.  Consequently it is inappropriate to attempt to characterize this broad field with a 
single  idealized  model.  Instead,  examples  of  the  diversity  of  vulnerability  assessment 
methods include: 
(a)  Global  indices  such  as  the  Disaster  Risk  Index  of  the  United  Nations 
Development Programme, a univariate indicator that is constructed by dividing the number 
of  people  killed  by  a  natural  disaster  by  the  number  of  people  exposed,  and  the 
WorldRiskIndex of the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human 
Security, which is a composite of measures of exposure, susceptibility, coping and adaptive 
capacities (see box 7); 
(b)  Catastrophe  modelling  using  for  example  the  CATSIM  model  of 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, a process-based computer simulation 
model linking weather disasters with economic outcomes; 
(c)  Measures of sectoral vulnerability; 
(d)  Community-based  disaster  risk  indices  and  community-based  self-
assessment. 
H.  Disaster loss assessment 
15.  Closely  related  to  vulnerability  assessment  is  the  narrower  task  of  disaster 
loss/damage assessment. This takes place after a natural disaster and is intended to reveal 
the extent of losses, such as fatalities and economic losses, including insured and uninsured 
losses. In analysing economic losses, disaster loss/damage assessment potentially faces the 
same sorts of questions that concern ex ante CBA, such as how to include non-market 
effects, but in practice the scope of disaster loss/damage assessment has tended to focus 
more narrowly on market effects, even just insured losses. Damage assessment is often 
conducted as a rapid survey to inform responses such as humanitarian aid. 
I.  Climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability assessment  
16.  Recent years have witnessed the emergence of the specific application of appraisal 
and assessment techniques to climate change impacts and adaptation planning at multiple 
scales  from  the  global  to  the  local.  Many  of  the  examples  of  this  are  synthesized  by 
Working Group II of the IPCC (e.g. in the Fourth Assessment Report). Like vulnerability 
assessment, there is a diversity of approaches within CCIAV, the three main types being: 
(a)  Impact-based  approaches,  which  evaluate  the  expected  impacts  of  climate 
change and then identify adaptation options to reduce any resulting vulnerability; 
(b)  Adaptation-based  and  vulnerability-based  approaches,  which  identify 
processes  affecting  vulnerability  and  adaptive  capacity,  normally  independent  of  any 
specific future climate forecast. Therefore, such approaches can be understood as a specific 
application of vulnerability assessment as described above;  
66 
 
(c)  Risk-management approaches, which focus directly on decision-making and 
offer a framework for incorporating all approaches as well as confronting uncertainty. 
17.  The impacts-based approach is a so-called ‘science-first’ or top-down framework, in 
that  it  takes  a  linear  approach  of  from  prediction  to  action.  It  begins  by  producing 
projections of changes in emissions and ends by exploring the economic and non-economic 
effects  of  a  range  of  adaptation  options.  The  use  of  integrated  assessment  models  for 
CCIAV is therefore an example of such an approach. 
18.  Conversely,  the  adaptation-based,  vulnerability-based  and  risk-management 
approaches  are  examples  of  ‘policy-first’  or  bottom-up  frameworks.  A  policy-first 
framework typically begins at the scale of the adaptation problem, specifying objectives 
and  constraints,  identifying  viable  adaptation  strategies  and  only  then  assessing  the 
desirability of these against a set of objectives and future projections. 
19.  While the conceptual differences between the approaches may not be so large, in 
practice it has been argued that policy-first approaches require much less information about 
the predicted impacts of climate change. In the end, some of this information turns out not 
to be of great significance for the vulnerability of the area under study (Ranger et al., 2010). 
       